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THE EVOLUTIONARY DRIFr OF
VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT: FROM
INTERSTITIAL GAP FILLER TO
ARBITER OF THE CONTENT WARS
Craig A. Grossman*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE FIELD WHERE CONTENT
BATTLES TECHNOLOGY
N recent years, major content owners, such as film studios and record
labels, have waged all-out legal warfare against Napster, Scour,
Kazaa and other peer-to-peer ("P2P") file sharing networks. With-
out question, digital technologies and novel network architectures pose
new legal problems and practical threats to the status quo of the so-called
copyright industries. If taken in a broader view, however, this spasm of
litigation is merely the most recent emanation of the generations-old bat-
tle between content and technology, in effect, the continuation of the
same industrial turf war that pitted the film studios against the manufac-
turer of the VCR in the eighties, the record labels against purveyors of
cassette tape systems and services in the seventies and the publishers
against manufacturers of photocopiers in the sixties.' In each case, the
* BA and MA Stanford University; JD Harvard Law School. Executive Director,
The FedEx Institute of Technology at the University of Memphis. The author wishes to
thank the University of Memphis School of Law Foundation for its support of this article.
The reader may wish to know that prior to becoming a commentator, the author was at one
time General Counsel and then CEO of Scour, Inc., a leading multi-media search engine
and file sharing network in its time. Scour managed a successful sale after the commence-
ment of litigation by all of the MPAA, RIAA and NMPA companies. His experience as a
participant in the copyright wars of recent years has left him with no axes to grind other
than a desire to explore and highlight what he believes to be inadequacies of the current
law for all constituencies involved-content owner, technology innovator and consumer.
His hope is that his experience within the debate will afford greater insight as an external
observer and commentator.
1. See generally, Gerald J. Sophar, Nature of the Problem, in REPROGRAPHY AND
COPYRIcrrr LAW 3, 4-5(Lowell H. Hattery & George P. Bush eds., 1964) (providing infor-
mation and a variety of scholarly views on the efforts of the publishing industry to squelch
the first automated, widely distributed photocopier, the Xerox 914, in 1960). Similarly, the
recording industry fought the audio cassette recorder, unsuccessfully pushing for a royalty
on cassette recorders and tapes. See Jon Pareles, Grabbing for Royalties in the Digital Age,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, § 2, at 26. However, the recording industry did succeed in
limiting the business arrangements made possible by the audio cassette recorder by statute
with the Record Rental Agreement of 1984 which generally forbids the renting of pho-
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macro business issue is the same: a new device or system, now commonly
termed a "destructive technology" by those on the content side, threat-
ens the established modes of business and distribution controlled by con-
tent owners by virtue of their copyright ownership. In each case, the
argument raised by the content owners is that their copyright monopoly
in the popular content that will be played, recorded, or distributed via
this new technology extends to, and therefore, renders illegal the device
or system at issue (absent some sort of license from and/or payment to
the copyright owner), whether it is a VCR, a photocopier, or file sharing
network. In almost every case, the legal theory argued by the content
owners against the technologists is essentially the same. Although the
purveyors of technology do not directly violate copyright, as they do not
copy, distribute, or otherwise tread on the statutory rights protecting film,
music, and other works; they are contributorily infringing or vicariously
liable for the infringements committed by users of their device or
service.2
Giving the historical and current battleground between the rights of
technologists and copyright owners its due, the focal point of this article is
a detailed examination of the origins, evolution, and supporting policies
of the doctrines of contributory infringement and vicarious liability in the
context of the once novel business methods that shaped the doctrines
over the decades. The doctrines themselves are designed to pin liability
on those who do not actually violate the copyright statute; that is, those
who do not directly infringe copyright rights, but who, as a matter of fair-
ness or to serve some other overarching policy concern, should nonethe-
less be liable for the copyright infringement committed by others within
their ambit. The history of the doctrines is thus the story of judicial ef-
forts to stretch the law to capture succeeding generations of always-in-
ventive business people and pirates looking to skirt liability.
norecords. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1997). Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) stands as the seminal case ruling on the legality of the first rela-
tively inexpensive consumer VCR, the Sony Betamax. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) is the result of the recording industry's war against the first mover
in P2P file sharing networks.
2. There are, of course, notable exceptions where a technologist arguably engages in
direct copyright infringement (most notably in recent years) such as in UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Likewise, there are limited
cases in which content owner plaintiffs pursue theories other than indirect copyright liabil-
ity, as in the Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072 (9th Cir. 1999). Notwithstanding the similarities of that case, challenging the legality
of the portable MP3 player, to the Sony VCR case, the Diamond case was decided on
highly technical grounds under the Audio Home Recording Act. See id. Lastly, the most
significant case dealing with the photocopier involved a claim of direct infringement. Wil-
liams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally
divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). In Williams & Williams, a major medical publisher
elected to sue the United States government based on the use of photocopiers at the Na-
tional Institute of Health and the National Library of Medicine. Id. at 1346-47. Presuma-
bly, the relatively high cost of the main device at issue, the Xerox 914, made libraries the
logical defendants.
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The net result of this evolutionary expansion to get at the bad guys is
legal standards so lax that they no longer serve their intended policies,
constrain judicial reasoning or provide predictable results. The co-con-
spirator in a counterfeiting scheme, as well as someone providing park-
ing, plumbing or other "support services" at a swap meet may be on the
hook for copyright infringement. Both the dancehall owner who profits
from the infringing performances of his orchestra, and the organizer of a
trade show whose participants may play infringing music in their booths
are liable for copyright infringement. Though there are a number of rea-
sons for expansion of the limiting factors in these doctrines (such as
knowledge and contributory acts for contributory infringement, right and
ability to control, and financial benefit for vicarious liability) the overall
effect is rules that may extend copyright liability to those indirectly, even
remotely involved with the actual reproduction or distribution of content.
II. THE STANDARDS AS DEVELOPED: THE TEXTUAL END
OF THE JOURNEY
A. THE STANDARDS
In order to better understand the journey, it may be useful to know the
ultimate destination. Nearly a century of litigation has produced widely
accepted verbal formulations of the rules for secondary copyright liabil-
ity. Following the leadership of the Second Circuit, courts have expanded
the concepts of respondeat superior and joint and several liability for
tortfeasors deeply into the field of copyright,3 creating two major sub-
species of indirect copyright liability: (1) "vicarious liability" which holds
a party liable if "he has the right and ability to supervise the infringing
activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities,"' 4 and (2)
"contributory infringement" which holds a party liable if he has "knowl-
edge of the infringing activity [and] induces, causes or materially contrib-
utes to the infringing conduct of another." 5
These verbal formulae are now relatively fixed, but this is the end point
of historical development, at least as far as the language of the rules go.
The history of the doctrines of contributory infringement and vicarious
liability begins with gap-filling ad hoc cases far more limited in scope than
the general language that ultimately emerged might indicate.
3. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 435.
4. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
5. Id. The nomenclature in this area can be confusing. Frequently, the broad concept
of holding one liable for the infringements of another is termed "vicarious liability," with
"contributory liability" being one subspecies of this broader concept. See Sony Corp. of
Am., 464 U.S. at 435. However, different standards for liability with different rationales
have evolved in the case law under the headings of "vicarious liability" and "contributory
liability." To avoid confusion, this article treats "vicarious liability" and "contributory in-
fringement" separately and refers to the broader concept of holding one party liable for
the acts of another as "indirect liability."
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B. THE MODEST ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINES
1. Very Limited Concepts
In contrast with the Patent Act, the Copyright Act does not impose
liability on anyone other than actual, direct infringers.6 However, as the
Supreme Court explained in Sony, "vicarious liability is imposed in virtu-
ally all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is
merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances
in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of
another."'7 Although the mission of identifying all the circumstances in
which it is just to hold one accountable for another's actions is rather
broad, the application of indirect copyright liability was quite narrow for
most of the doctrine's history. In 1984, the Supreme Court summarized
the precedent in which holding a third party liable was just as those in-
stances in which "the 'contributory' infringer was in a position to control
the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use with-
out permission from the copyright owner."'8 Indeed, the concept of au-
thorizing the exploitation of another's work was so closely tied with the
6. Unlike the Copyright Act, the Patent Act expressly provides that "[w]hoever ac-
tively induces infringement of a patent" or who meets the definition of "contributory in-
fringer" is liable for patent infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c) (2003). Trademark law,
on the other hand, has a court-constructed standard of contributory liability, quite similar
to the standard developed in the copyright context. The Supreme Court confirmed that
if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or
has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer
or distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm done as a result of
the deceit.
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
7. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 435.
8. Id. at 437. In encapsulating the precedent, the Court relied heavily on the opinion
authored by Justice Holmes in Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). In Kalem,
the Court held that the producer of an unauthorized film dramatization of the copyrighted
novel Ben Hur, was liable for sale of the motion picture to distributors who arranged for
exhibition of the film. See Kalem, 222 U.S. at 60. When reviewing the case precedents in
the Sony opinion, the Supreme Court characterized the precedents as situations in which
the contributory infringer "authorized the use without permission from the copyright
owner." Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 437. In fact, the Court in Sony went on to distin-
guish the sales of video tape recorders at issue in that case from the prior cases on the
grounds that the case against the VCR rested on providing the "means" of copying and
"constructive knowledge" of that copying-a circumstance for which "[t]here is no prece-
dent in the law of copyright." Id. at 439. The Supreme Court summarized its own and
lower court precedent: "In such cases, as in other situations in which the imposition of
vicarious liability is manifestly just, the 'contributory' infringer was in a position to control
the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission
from the copyright owner." Id. at 437.
See also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(finding defendant liable for authorizing/licensing a third-party to breach another's copy-
right by making unauthorized copies or performances); Celestial Arts, Inc. v. Neylor
Color-Lith Co., 339 F. Supp. 1018, 1019 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (noting in response to defendant's
argument that "contracting" with a third party to produce counterfeit copies does not con-
stitute infringement that, "[fi]t is well settled that all parties who unite to produce counter-
feit copies of copyrighted material are liable for damages.").
See also Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 435 (indicating that "contributory infringement"
was a fairly narrow concept).
[Vol. 58
Evolutionary Drift of Vicarious Liability
concept of "contributory infringement" that many courts and commenta-
tors viewed the addition of the new right "to authorize" exercise of other
copyright rights in the 1976 Copyright Act as merely a confirmation of
the doctrine of contributory liability as developed under the 1909 Act, the
copyright statute which immediately preceded the present Act.9
Similarly, the primordial cases for the now parallel and separate doc-
trine of vicarious liability evidence no grand principle in the making, nor
even a distinct doctrine. Rather, what emerges is a hodge-podge of rul-
ings dealing with specific situations. The early cases show courts trying to
distinguish based almost exclusively on policy between business arrange-
ments to which no copyright liability should attach and those to which it
should. Absentee landlords provide the paradigm of innocence, 10 while
proprietors of entertainment and hospitality establishments are found lia-
ble for the infringing performances of their employees" and independent
contractor orchestras.' 2
9. See MELLVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04
(1963) (reading the addition of the copyright right to "authorize" exercise of rights by
others in 17 U.S.C. § 106 as confirming the established notions of indirect liability under
the 1909 Copyright Act rather than creating a new, independent basis for infringement)
[hereinafter NIMMER]. Nimmer's interpretation is consistent with the view of the House
Report on the 1976 Act. The House Report explains that the "[u]se of the phrase 'to
authorize' is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers."
H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N., 5659, 5674. The court in
Danjaq v. MGM/UA Communications, Co., 773 F. Supp. 194, 201 (C.D. Cal. 1991) likewise
interpreted the use of "authorize" in the 1976 Act as merely confirming the existing con-
tributory liability doctrine, not establishing a new basis of direct infringement. But see
ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Cal. Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 860 (E.D. Cal. 1992)
(holding that the right to "authorize" in 17 U.S.C. § 106 provides a new basis of direct
infringement). In ITSI, the court found United States jurisdiction of a copyright matter
because the "authorizing" took place in the United States, even if other infringement took
place in a foreign country. Id. at 862-64. The holding in Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v.
Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986) similarly found that "authorizing" public perform-
ance by renting rooms to watch videos is a direct infringement under the 1976 Act.
10. Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938) ("Something more than the mere
relation of landlord and tenant must exist to give rise to a cause of action by plaintiffs
against these defendants for infringement of their copyright on the demised premises.");
Fromont v. Aeolian Co., 254 F. 592 (D.C.N.Y. 1918) (holding a concert hall owner not
liable for infringing performances on its premises by a lessee who rented the hall). The
Fromont court explained its ultimate policy judgement:
Viewing the act and its purpose, it seems to me that a defendant cannot be
called a coinfringer who is in no sense an inducing party to the infringement,
who derives no profit from the infringement, excepting in the very remote
way in which it is urged that this defendant landlord derived profit here; and
where, as here, a defendant enters into an ordinary everyday business con-
tract, without any knowledge whatever of a threatened infringement, and
thus becomes bound under the contract, it seems to me that the construction
contended for by plaintiff would result in visiting upon innocent landlords a
penalty which the statute never contemplated.
Id. at 594.
11. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917) (Holmes, J.) (holding proprietor of
restaurant and hotel liable for the infringing performances by employees on premises).




2. Loose Fluid Concepts
Given the breadth of the task at hand-for courts to identify those cir-
cumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the
actions of another-cases involving indirect copyright liability have of-
fered standards that are loose, imprecise, and fluid. Because the doc-
trines of contributory and vicarious liability have developed through
equitable, case-specific judgments, often relying on analogies to other ar-
eas of the law, the "lines between direct infringement, contributory in-
fringement and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn .... "13 As
another court put it, "[t]he courts have been less than precise in their
delineation of the contours of contributory versus vicarious liability for
copyright infringement."' 14 One species of indirect liability is rarely
found, or even discussed, without the other.15
Reading the precedent with the modern, settled standards in mind; it is
clear that the judges who supposedly crafted the standards over the years
had no such distinct standards in mind. In its 1968 ruling in Chappell &
Co. v. Frankel, the Southern District of New York found the defendant's
knowledge or lack of knowledge immaterial to holding the defendant
contributorily liable on joint and several liability, tort-type reasoning. 16
Of course, under the settled standard, "knowledge" is one of only two
elements of contributory infringement. 17 The majority in Sony uses "vi-
carious infringer" and "contributory infringer" interchangeably, rational-
izing that contributory infringement is merely a subspecies of vicarious
liability.18 Similarly, the dissent in Sony cites the dance hall cases, dis-
cussed below, for the proposition that actual knowledge is not required
for contributory liability.19 Under the now oft-quoted standards, the
dance hall cases are considered foundational precedent for the doctrine
of vicarious liability, which has no knowledge element, as opposed to con-
tributory infringement, which requires knowledge. 20 Thus, it seems that
as late as 1984, the best and most influential legal minds had yet to iden-
tify the standards for indirect copyright liability now cited with the impri-
matur of aged precedent. Indeed, the first mention in a reported federal
case of vicarious liability in copyright appears to be the seminal H.L.
Green opinion in 1963.21
13. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 435.
14. ITSI T. V. Prods., 785 F. Supp. at 860.
15. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 12.04[A] ("The boundaries between these two categories
[contributory and vicarious liability] are often fluid.").
16. Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 285 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (reasoning that de-
fendant's "knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of the actual infringement does not alter the
fact that he caused the infringement" in finding defendant president, director and share-
holder of corporation producing illicit compilation recordings contributorily liable).
17. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
18. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 435.
19. Id. at 488 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
20. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
21. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963). The
first mention of contributory infringement in the copyright context yielded by the research
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The apparent confusion in the terminology and application of the stan-
dards demonstrates that the standards, as we know them, simply were not
a force in the earlier decisions. Rather, the law until recently was the
equitable, common law mush produced by courts trying to do justice in
individual cases, often relying on no more than analogies to other areas of
the law. One can see the elements of the rules that ultimately developed.
Even as early as 1918, all the factors are present in some form.22 How-
ever, though present, the elements appear in an indistinct jumble that can
only be parsed and given added significance once the rules that ultimately
emerged a half century later are known.
The now oft and consistently articulated standards for vicarious and
contributory infringement are the result of recent courts, led by the Sec-
ond Circuit, working to divine rationalizing standards from the loose eq-
uitable judgments of prior courts.
III. TORT AND AGENCY PRINCIPLES-A POST
HOC RECONSTRUCTION
A. CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT AS JOINT AND SEVERAL
TORT LIABILITY
The tort concept of joint and several liability and the agency principle
of respondeat superior provided rationales around which the current ver-
bal formulations of contributory infringement and vicarious liability coa-
lesced. Looking backward in 1996, the Ninth Circuit was able to discern,
"[c]ontributory infringement originates in tort law and stems from the
notion that one who directly contributes to another's infringement should
be held accountable. ' 23 Courts going back to the 1920s, and perhaps
even earlier held that copyright infringement is a tort.24 One later court
reasoned that
Since infringement constitutes a tort, common law concepts of tort
liability are relevant in fixing the scope of the statutory copyright
remedy, and the basic common law doctrine that one who knowingly
participates in or furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally liable
with the prime tort-feasor is applicable in suits arising under the
for this article occurs in 1944 in JEROME V. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 58 F. Supp.
13 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
22. In the Fromont case in which a concert hall owner was found not liable for the
infringements of a third party that rented the hall for a performance, the court considered
that the defendant "had no knowledge that Rosita Renard [the infringing pianist] was to
perform any copyrighted works of the plaintiff," that defendant had "no ... control over
the pianist," and that defendant "did not derive any profit whatever from the performance,
except the amount agreed upon [the rental fee for the facilities]." Fromont v. Acolian Co.,
254 F. 592, 593 (D.C. N.Y. 1968). The court indicated further that liability may have at-
tached if defendant had "arranged" or "induced" the infringement. Id. at 593-94. The
Fromont case even discussed the timing of the notice of infringement, indicating that for
the notice to result in meaningful knowledge it had to be received when remedial action
was possible, before the defendant became obliged under the lease agreement in that case.
Id.
23. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).




Thus, it made some sense when the Second Circuit glommed onto joint
and several liability for tortfeasors as a rationalizing principle when it
articulated the now well-worn standard for contributory infringement in
the Gershwin case: "[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activ-
ity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another, may be held liable as a contributory infringer. '26
B. VICARIOUS INFRINGEMENT AS AGENCY-LIGHT
The story with respect to vicarious liability is similar. Looking back-
ward, a court can confidently state that the "concept of vicarious copy-
right liability was developed in the Second Circuit as an outgrowth of the
agency principles of respondeat superior.' '27 Courts had long applied the
agency principle of respondeat superior to find an employer liable for in-
fringements of his employee. 28 Courts had also long found one party vi-
cariously liable for the acts of another even where a legal employer/
employee relationship did not exist, most notably in the context of inde-
pendent contractor orchestras in dance halls.29 It was not until 1963 that
the Second Circuit adopted a loose respondeat superior concept as an or-
ganizing principle in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., the case
which articulated what appears to be the vicarious liability standard for
our age.30 The court first noted that agency principles have been applied
to hold a party liable for another's copyright infringement, that, conse-
quently, vicarious liability has also been found in independent contractor
situations, and then spackled over the gap by stating that "[m]any of the
elements which have given rise to the doctrine of respondeat superior,...
may also be evident in factual settings other than that of a technical em-
ployer-employee relationship. '31 The court could then articulate its re-
spondeat superior-like standard for vicarious liability:
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and
direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materi-
als-even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright mo-
nopoly is being impaired ... the purposes of copyright law may be
best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of
that exploitation.32
25. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
26. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
27. Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 261-62.
28. M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412, 414 (E.D. Tenn. 1927).
29. Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir.
1929) (finding dance hall owners liable for infringements of orchestra even though orches-
tra was an independent contractor and selected the music it played).
30. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
31. Id. at 307 (internal citations omitted).
32. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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The Second Circuit's verbal formulations and the post-hoc rationales
provided did go a long way toward explaining the precedent and gave
other courts some standards to apply. What is important to note here,
however, is that the current verbal formulations of the vicarious and con-
tributory copyright liability standards represent a relatively late-in-the-
game effort to rationalize a m6lange of common law precedent. The tort
enterprise liability and agency respondeat superior rationales are organiz-
ing principles used to explain a much longer history of indirect liability
cases going back to the legal stewardship of Justice Holmes, not integral
concepts that drove the decisions during most of the last century. Though
present in the Second Circuit as early as H.L. Green33 in 1963 and Gersh-
win34 in 1971, respectively, the tort and agency organizing analogies do
not appear to have reached oft-quoted, legal dogma status across the cir-
cuits until the 1990s.
IV. THE POLICIES BEHIND THE RULES AND THEIR
PRACTICAL APPLICATION
A. POLICIES' OBJECTIVES INHERENT IN THE RULES
Just as later courts were able to find organizing principles in tort and
agency that explained the precedent, one can discern policies inherent in
the standards of indirect liability that have emerged, as well as applica-
tion of those policies in the significant body of precedent. The doctrines
of contributory infringement and vicarious liability together further sev-
eral closely related purposes: (1) fairness, (2) risk allocation and loss
spreading, and (3) incentivizing policing and self-regulation. 35
Simple fairness is arguably the overarching purpose of the rules-to
ensure that those culpable pay, or, as the Supreme Court put it, to iden-
tify "the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accounta-
ble for the actions of another. '36 Thus, an agency that places ads for the
sale of infringing records, the radio station that broadcasts the ads, and
the packing company that ships the infringing records all may be held
indirectly liable for copyright infringement. 37 The person in charge may
be held responsible for the actions of his subordinates.
38
In each case, if the "knowledge" prong of the test for contributory in-
fringement is met, it would seem fair to hold the third party at issue liable
for the conduct of the direct infringer. He knew he was assisting in con-
33. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d at 304.
34. Gershwin Publ'g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1159.
35. Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp 1314, 1325-26 (D.
Mass. 1994) (summarizing the policies inherent in vicarious liability decisions).
36. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
37. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (holding ad agency, radio stations and third-party distributor liable for
sale of bootleg compilation record).
38. Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 285 F. Supp. 798, 800-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding an
individual who was president, a director and major shareholder of a corporation indirectly
liable for production and sale of unauthorized compilation records by corporation).
2005]
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duct that violated the law and did it anyway. With the doctrines of indi-
rect liability, and contributory infringement in particular, courts need not
get hung up on who put the tape in the machine, 39 who selected the music
to be played,n° or whether the direct infringer was an employee or inde-
pendent contractor.41 If the defendant's hands are not clean, he can be
held accountable.
However, simple fairness is not the only consideration in play, particu-
larly with respect to vicarious liability cases where strict liability ratio-
nales are often applied and liability found even in the absence of
knowledge by the defendant, occasionally where the infringing activity
violated the express instructions of the defendant. Under the logic of risk
allocation/loss spreading employed in typical tort policy judgments, the
party engaged in the enterprise that infringes the rights of another should
bear the cost of such infringement. The risk should be factored into the
cost of running the enterprise, particularly where the enterprise profits
from the infringement. Thus, a department store that receives a royalty
on bootleg records sold by a concessionaire, 42 a dancehall owner where
infringing music is played to dancehall patrons, 43 and a racetrack where
infringing music is played, even without the knowledge and against the
express orders of management, can be held liable.44
Similarly, a party with the right and ability to control the actions of the
direct infringer may be held liable whether or not the party knew about
the infringement because that party was in a position to police the con-
duct of the direct infringer and failed to do so.45 If a defendant has the
power to police the conduct of the direct infringer, holding it liable "will
simply encourage it to do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and
should be effectively exercised. '46 If a person has the ability to prevent
the infringement from taking place in the first place-whether that per-
son is a dancehall operator, a department store, a racetrack, or a trade
show-the law will incentivize him to do so by holding him strictly liable
39. Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs., Inc., 300 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)(finding a prima facie case of contributory infringement despite dispute over role of defen-
dant's employees in operating the "Make-A-Tape" machines at issue).
40. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161-63 (2d
Cir. 1971) (finding defendant concert organizer/talent agency contributorily liable even
though artists independently selected the copyrighted music allegedly infringed).
41. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1963)(finding department store liable for independent contractor concessionaire's infringe-
ments). See also Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 288, 355(7th Cir. 1929) and the various dancehall cases finding the dancehall operator vicariously
liable for the infringing musical selections played by independent contractor orchestras.
42. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d at 306 (finding department store liable for independent
contractor concessionaire's infringements).
43. Dreamland Ball Room, Inc., 36 F.2d at 355 (finding that dancehall is liable for
infringing music selected and played by independent contractor orchestra).
44. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, Inc.,
554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977) (finding horse track liable for playing of infringing music by
independent contractor music provider, despite direct instructions from horse track man-
agement not to play any of plaintiff's compositions).
45. See H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d at 308.
46. Id.
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for the infringements of those under his control, even if the direct infring-
ers were actually acting against his specific orders or standing policies in
committing the infringement.4
7
Under the logic of risk allocation/loss spreading and encouraging polic-
ing, "[i]t is the innocent infringer who must suffer, since he, unlike the
copyright owner, either has an opportunity to guard against the infringe-
ment (by diligent inquiry), or at least the ability to guard against the in-
fringement (by an indemnity agreement . . . and/or by insurance)." 48
Where the "knowledge" prong of the contributory infringement test en-
sures that as a matter of fairness those culpable are liable, the "control"
and "direct financial benefit" elements of the vicarious liability standard
ensure that those able to police and prevent the conduct and those who
benefit from the conduct are liable.4
9
B. WHERE THE DOCTRINES HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN USED
Consistent with the policy objectives outlined above, theories of indi-
rect copyright liability have typically been used in situations in which the
pursuit of the direct infringer is impractical, ineffective or risks letting a
bad actor off the hook. In keeping with the broad purpose of fairness,
vicarious and contributory liability theories are often pressed against a
clearly "bad guy" who may have played a major role in infringement but
has studiously avoided the specific acts covered by 17 U.S.C. § 106, which
defines the rights protected by copyright.50 Someone who finances and
organizes the production and distribution of pirated records can thus be
held to account, even if he played primarily a management and organiza-
tional role, leaving the actual acts of copying and distribution to others.51
Likewise, theories of indirect liability are used to prevent gaming the
system through corporate shell games and alter egos as in the founda-
tional cases of Gershwin52 and H.L. Green Co..53 In Gershwin, artists
represented by the defendant talent management company, together with
a local concert organization established under the aegis of the defendant,




The court held the defendant talent agency liable, noting its "pervasive
participation in the formation and direction of this association and its
47. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
48. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d at 308 (quoting a letter from Professor Melville B. Nim-
mer to the Copyright Office; citation omitted).
49. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005).
51. The defendant in A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1457 (C.D.
Cal. 1996) was found contributorily liable for the production of bootleg cassette tapes
where the defendant timed legitimate tapes, sold "time-loaded" blank cassettes corre-
sponding to the works to be copied, sold duplication machines, referred customers to
others for the reproduction of card inserts, and in some cases, even provided financial
assistance to aspiring pirates.
52. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir.
1971).
53. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1063).
54. Gershwin Publ'g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1163.
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programming of compositions. ' 55 The court in H.L. Green similarly
found a department store liable for the sale of bootleg records from its
music department despite the fact that the music department was run by
an independent contractor concessionaire, not the store entity itself.56
There, the court expressly stated its fears that a contrary result would
result in large "department stores establishing 'dummy' concessions" to
serve as "a buffer against liability while reaping the proceeds of infringe-
ment."'57 Contributory infringement and vicarious liability theories are
essential tools to ensure that copyright cannot be skirted merely by creat-
ing a multiplicity of subordinate entities.
In closely related circumstances, theories of indirect copyright liability
allow content owners to go after the controlling or responsible figures
within organizations. In many cases, company officers, major sharehold-
ers and directors are named as defendants. 58 Even if a corporate entity
exists, these controlling figures may be the logical target in a fly-by-night
or undercapitalized entity, a typical state of affairs for piracy operations.
These figures could themselves be bad actors or, even if not fairly culpa-
ble in their own right, could be legitimate defendants due to their ability
to prevent the infringement and their failure to do so. The policies em-
bedded in the vicarious liability standard can be (and have been) inter-
preted as imposing a "the buck stops here" level of responsibility on
corporate managers that cannot be lessened by ignorance, intention or
even positive acts.
The foregoing circumstances-breaking through organizational struc-
tures designed to skirt liability, attacking the bad actor, holding the per-
son in charge accountable-tend to be the norm in normal enforcement
actions, that is, efforts to go after run-of-the-mill pirates of various
stripes. The higher profile cases, and the circumstances most important
for the purposes of this article, are those in which contributory and vicari-
ous liability theories are pressed against manufacturers of a product or
the providers of a service which can be used to commit copyright in-
fringement. From the copyright owner's point of view, the indirect liabil-
ity doctrine is essential because pursuing individuals is a wholly
55. Id.
56. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d at 308.
57. Id. at 309. The principle applied in this organizational/corporate context is, in es-
sence, the same as that applied in the hoary cases which hold a dancehall operator liable
for the infringements of an independent contractor band. Cable/Home Communication
Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding defendant president,
director and shareholder of corporation liable for activities of corporation engaged in pro-
moting illicit descrambler chips for satellite TV boxes); Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Sha-
piro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929); Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 285 F. Supp.
798 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding defendant president, director and shareholder of corporation
liable for copyright infringement).
58. See e.g., Cable/Home Communication, 902 F.2d at 854 (finding defendant presi-
dent, director and shareholder of corporation liable for activities of corporation engaged in
promoting illicit descrambler chips for satellite TV boxes); Chappell & Co., 285 F. Supp. at
801 (finding defendant president, director and shareholder of corporation liable for copy-
right infringement).
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impractical means of enforcement if the activity is widespread. If con-
sumers are widely using a product or a technology, such as a cassette tape
player, to make infringing reproductions, going after the direct infringers
(the consumers) hardly provides a workable remedy if millions of cassette
recorders are sold every year. It is this use of contributory and vicarious
liability to curb massive consumer activity that best describes the Sony
59
case involving the legality of the VCR, the Diamond60 case challenging
the legality of the MP3 player, as well as Napster6 1 and the other cases
involving online services and networks.62 In these cases, the focus is not
so much on the proximity of the defendant to the piracy or his actual or
formal responsibility for the piracy, as it is on the product or service at
issue. These cases are existential inquiries into the nature of the chal-
lenged product or service with copyright owners arguing that such a thing
cannot be permitted to exist in a world which respects copyright and the
defendants making the case for creativity and freedom in the market-
place, perhaps with some incidental infringement standing as the price to
be paid for such freedoms. 63
59. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
60. See generally, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc.,
180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
61. See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 2001).
62. One must qualify the foregoing with the observation that the major film studios
and record labels have apparently determined that pursuing central technology or service
providers under theories of contributory infringement or vicarious liability is by itself inad-
equate, notwithstanding the impressive success of the film and music plaintiffs in shutting
down successive generations of file sharing services. Beginning in 2003, the film studios
and record label plaintiffs began pursuing the direct infringers directly, en masse.
CNETNews.com Staff, File-swap suits strike a nerve, (Sept. 10, 2003) at http://
new.com.com/file-swapsuits§trike+a-erve/2009-10323-5073343.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2005). There is anecdotal evidence indicating that the in terrorem effect of these mass
filings have succeeded in stemming the demand for illicit content online, where the major
victories against funded technology companies failed. At a minimum, the Recording In-
dustry Association of America ("RIAA"), the enforcement agency of the U.S. music in-
dustry, has claimed that its mass filings of direct infringement claims against individual
users of file sharing services have achieved a large degree of success. Matt Hines, RIAA
Drops Amnesty Program, (Apr. 20, 2004), at http://news.com.com/RIAAtrops+amnesty
rogram/2100-1027_3-5195301.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
These lawsuits have been criticized for being somewhat indiscriminate, sweeping small
children, befuddled grandparents and enraged parents, as well as the presumably intended
target, Gen Y downloaders, into court. However, one may rationally conclude that it is
precisely this indiscriminate, everyone-should-expect-a-summons quality to these actions
that have made the tactic successful.
Ironically, to the extent the RIAA claims of success in curbing the piracy are correct, the
need for indirect liability theories to attack the problems of massive piracy is undermined
in equal degree. The results of the RIAA litigation campaign are significant in that it may
be the first national (now international) programmatic effort to stem infringement on a
mass scale at the direct-infringer consumer level with mass filings of copyright suits. Not-
withstanding the RIAA claims of success and continued filings, some studies show that file
sharing has increased, notwithstanding the suits against consumers. Id. See also Matt
Hines, File-sharing Lawsuits go Abroad (Mar. 30, 2004), at http://news.com.com/file-shar-
ing+lawsuits+go+abroad/2100/1027_3-5181872.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
63. See generally Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 417; Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc.,
180 F.3d at 1072; Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1004.
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V. FORCES PUSHING EXPANSION OF THE STANDARDS
If the doctrines of contributory and vicarious copyright liability had
humble, limited beginnings as ad-hoc, gap-filling holdings, crafted by
judges to do justice where the express terms of the statute fell a little
short, they now serve as principles of sweeping scope and general applica-
tion. As discussed in detail below, the standards for contributory and
vicarious liability, as interpreted and applied by recent courts, have ex-
panded to a potential reach so broad, that the standards are arguably
approaching meaninglessness. The doctrines throw the legality of any un-
licensed endeavor related to the manipulation of content in doubt, leav-
ing every copyright owner with a good faith basis for suit and almost
unfettered discretion in judges to determine the outcome of those suits.
Several forces have driven this expansion.
A. BROAD MANDATE AND POLICIES
The broad mandate and policies of the doctrines naturally drive expan-
sion of the cases in which liability will be found. If the goal, in its most
general form, is to identify all the circumstances in which it is just to hold
one liable for the infringements of another, the doctrines will expand to
encompass an ever-growing body of fact patterns. As each new scheme
for piracy or gaming the current system is developed, the notions of indi-
rect liability must expand to meet them. Even if it began as covering just
those circumstances where one purports to license a work owned by an-
other, the precedent would naturally expand to cover other circumstances
that were not foreseen by the drafters of the statute-dancehalls, neigh-
borhood concert organizations, independent contractor concessionaire's
within a store, make-a-tape machines, video screening rooms and so on.
So long as new technology makes new arrangements relating to the copy-
ing and distribution of content possible, and so long as the creativity of
those who would skirt liability and those copyright owners who would
expand the scope of their monopoly exceeds the foresight of the drafters
of the statute, the doctrines must grow to capture new means of doing
business. At a minimum, a body of precedent covering a range of differ-
ent fact patterns must develop. There will inevitably be a natural growth
required to meet the broad mandate and policies of the doctrines in a
changing world.
B. THE LAWYER'S DRIVE TO RATIONALIZE AND SYNTHESIZE
What has driven the gross expansion of the doctrines far beyond this
natural growth, however, is the somewhat recent effort to rationalize the
prior holdings and distill this precedent into general standards. It is the
nature of lawyers and judges to try to make sense of things, but when
looking back at fifty years of scattered precedent (which serves a variety
of broad, loose policies, from encouraging policing to holding a bad actor
in any circumstance liable) articulating a standard is difficult. As dis-
cussed above, later courts split the ad-hoc holdings of history into the two
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primary categories of vicarious and contributory infringement, and then
rationalized each body of precedent with a rule drawing on agency and
tort concepts, respectively.64
This re-conceptualization of indirect liability under the tort and quasi-
agency rubrics and the new, more generalized standards articulated there-
under, however, represents a gross expansion of the "rules" of vicarious
and contributory infringement from those that had previously existed.
Where once there had been an apparent rule that licensing the reproduc-
tion of another's copyrighted work was contributory infringement, there
now stands a general principle as broad and as vague as tort law could
provide. Where once there was a hodge-podge of employer-employee,
employer-contractor, dancehall and oddball cases, there now is a genera-
lized concept of respondeat superior. The underlying tort and agency
rules were themselves quite broad in their natural state and habitat of
tort and agency/employment circumstances. However, in order to cap-
ture the full breadth of the precedent, courts had to make the principles
even broader. As discussed below, what copyright is left with then is the
principle of respondeat superior but with no requirement that an agency
or employment relationship exist (a necessary accommodation to capture
the independent-contractor dancehall precedents) and the concept of en-
terprise liability with no requirement that the defendant substantially par-
ticipate in the enterprise (an accommodation necessary to capture
schemes designed to limit the defendant's direct action). 65 Copyright
took what were broad principles to begin with, pared off the limiting re-
quirements, and adopted that unrestrained principle as its basic rule of
indirect liability.
C. A CENTURY-LONG LITIGATION CAMPAIGN
This natural expansion has been egged on at every step by the publish-
ing and entertainment industries which have waged a very successful, cen-
tury-long campaign to expand the doctrines of indirect liability. Almost
every time a new technology or business model related in any way to
content emerges, the entertainment industry has been quick to attack it,
with the theories of contributory and vicarious liability as its primary
weapons. Surely, some of these new technologies and business models
were over the line, and the entertainment industry has garnered some
significant victories. The point is that the entertainment industry,
through its well-funded prosecutorial organizations (the RIAA, MPAA,
NMPA and the like), attacks almost everything that it does not control.
Its great loss in Sony,66 which held the VCR to be a legal device, did not
stop the film industry from challenging separately almost every conceiva-
ble commercial use of the VCR, such as placement in hotel rooms, rental
64. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
65. See infra pp. 132-37.
66. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 417.
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video booths,67 or retail space, 68 or from challenging new recording de-
vices, such as the MP3 player 69 and Digital Video Recorder, 70 that share
many similarities with the VCR. The major content owners have been
extremely vigilant. Whenever there was a possible opportunity to throw
another significant technology or business arrangement into the prohib-
ited category, they took it. Frequently, they lost, but the result is necessa-
rily maximally applied doctrines of indirect liability. 71
The litigation campaign of the content industries, however, is not
merely to apply the law as is to new circumstances, but to expand the
legal standards themselves. When the stakes are low, in typical enforce-
ment actions and the like, the content industry representatives often push
to expand the standards, sometimes at the cost of picking up an easy vic-
tory under existing standards. Most significantly, the litigation in the area
has pushed the standard of contributory infringement beyond those cir-
cumstances when the parties would be found jointly and severally liable
under tort law and the standard of vicarious liability beyond those cir-
cumstances in which an actual agency or employment relationship exists.
In Polygram, for example, a group of major music publisher plaintiffs
represented by American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
("ASCAP") refused to put forward any evidence of an underlying in-
fringement or allege that any performances were unauthorized (though
they certainly could have) in the hopes of establishing what the court
termed "a precedent extraordinarily favorable to ASCAP members" at
the cost of not pressing "a more modest claim for a less dramatically
67. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding
that renting video tapes and viewing rooms with a VCR violates plaintiffs right to publicly
perform and authorize public performances of their works).
68. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3rd Cir. 1984)(holding that the playing of movies in stores selling VCR's violates plaintiff's copyright
right to publicly perform the work).
69. In Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., the RIAA challenged the portable MP3
players under the separate ground of the Audio Home Recording Act, a section of the
Copyright Act which, among other things, imposes limitations on the capabilities of certain
digital recording devices. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys.,
Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1999).
70. See Complaints, Paramount Pictures Corp. v. ReplayTV, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 921
(C.D. Cal.) (No. CV01-9358 FM, EX), available at www.eff.org/IP/Video/Paramount v
ReplayTV/?f=200/1031 complaint.html (challenging the commercial skipping and program
sharing features of the ReplayTV DVR on copyright grounds); Doug Isenberg, ReplayTV
Lawsuit: Napster Redux? (Nov. 12, 2001) at http://news.com.com/replaytv+lawsuit-apster
redux/2010-1071-3-281601.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
71. As the Ninth Circuit recently summed things up when examining a peer-to-peer
file sharing case:
From the advent of the player piano, every new means of reproducing sound
has struck a dissonant chord with musical copyright owners, often resulting in
federal litigation. This appeal is the latest reprise of that recurring conflict,
and one of a continuing series of lawsuits between the recording industry and
distributors of file-sharing computer software.
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and re-
manded, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
[Vol. 58
Evolutionary Drift of Vicarious Liability
favorable precedent. '72 The plaintiff music publishers lost as a result of
their clear refusal to make these fundamental allegations. 73 It seems that
this effort by ASCAP to detach the establishment of copyright liability
from the performance of specific, unauthorized performances was quite a
long-running affair, spanning the decades. The case law reflects that AS-
CAP was subject to a consent decree at least as early as 1941, requiring it
to give users an effective means of knowing what compositions are and
are not covered by ASCAP.74
Similarly the content owner plaintiff pushed for a gross expansion of
the doctrines in Screen Gems, a contributory infringement case against
bootleg record producers. 75 There, the plaintiff record company ac-
knowledged that its purpose was to establish a standard of "expanded
absolute liability," asking the court to hold as a matter of law that con-
tributory infringement may be found without any knowledge of the in-
fringement on the part of the defendant, actual or constructive. 76 The
plaintiff contended that such a standard is "the only feasible means to
meet the challenge of the bootleg record. ' 77 As the court put it, "[t]he
parties earnestly urged upon the court a determination of the issue as a
matter of law, since it is one of concern and importance to copyright own-
ers .... "78 In at least one case, content owners convinced a court to find
72. Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1323 (D. Mass.
1994).
73. In Polygram, the court ruled for defendants in the face of the plaintiff music pub-
lishers' refusal to make the requisite allegation of unauthorized performances. Id. at 1322.
The plaintiffs were apparently seeking to transform a solitary case from the District of
Delaware into an established precedent so that plaintiffs need not demonstrate to any de-
gree that the performances at issue were unauthorized. Id. at 1315. The court explained
the cost of using litigation for the strategic purpose of expanding the law:
Plaintiffs have chosen a strategy of seeking a ruling based on minimal evi-
dence-a ruling that, if affirmed on appeal, would establish a precedent ex-
traordinarily favorable to ASCAP members. In doing so, they have elected
not to press, in the alternative, a more modest claim for a less dramatically
favorable precedent. Of course, they will remain free, on another day in an-
other case, to make a more modest claim. The down side of pursuing such an
all-or-nothing strategy, however, is that the court may conclude, as I have,
that it leaves the court with no supportable choice, but to award nothing.
Id. at 1323.
74. Presumably, ASCAP was pursuing a policy to bludgeon users into purchasing a
license without giving them the means to determine whether they needed one or not. See
Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1969) (amending a 1941 consent decree
to require ASCAP to maintain and keep available for inspection a list of compositions in
its repertory in order to provide notice to potential infringers); Famous Music Corp. v. Bay
State Harness Horse & Breeding Ass'n, Inc., 554 F.2d 1213, 1215 (1st Cir. 1977) (rejecting
defendant's argument that ASCAP is estopped from enforcing its copyright under the
Tempo Music precedent, because defendant failed to request a list of ASCAP
compositions).
75. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 402
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
76. Id. at 401.
77. Id. at 403.
78. Id. In Screen Gems, the court was able to escape the plaintiff's demand for an
expanded interpretation of the law because actual or constructive knowledge had previ-
ously been asserted in the case. The court concluded: "However much the parties desire a
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contributory infringement without any knowledge requirement.79
More recently, in Grokster, one of the hotly contested file sharing
cases, the plaintiff film studios and record labels, demanded, among other
things, that the court modify the rules for secondary copyright liability so
that businesses would be required to modify products already distributed
to incorporate copyright enforcement technologies. 80 The Ninth Circuit
characterized the position urged by the copyright owner plaintiffs as "ex-
panding exponentially the reach of the doctrines of contributory and vica-
rious copyright infringement. ' 81 That court saw no basis in precedent in
the position urged by the plaintiff film studios and record labels and sug-
gested that nothing more than the pecuniary interests of the particular
plaintiffs in the case supported the radical rebalancing of content owner
and consumer rights demanded by the content owners. 82 "Doubtless,
taking that step would satisfy the Copyright Owners' immediate eco-
nomic aims," the court stated, "[h]owever, it would also alter general cop-
yright law in profound ways with unknown ultimate consequences outside
the present context. '83
Seeing the broader historical dynamic at play clearly, the Grokster
court placed its ruling in the context of the other short-sighted and in
hindsight-foolish positions taken by the major content owners in the face
of new technologies:
The introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old mar-
kets, and particularly to those copyright owners whose works are
sold through well-established distribution mechanisms. Yet, history
has shown that time and market forces often provide equilibrium in
balancing interests, whether the new technology be a player piano, a
copier, a tape recorder, a video recorder, a personal computer, a
karaoke machine, or an MP3 player. 84
Put in more colloquial terms, the court is telling the major content owners
that, every time a new gizmo hits the market, they have argued that the
rules are too lax to protect the interests of copyright owners and need to
be changed. Following the counsel of the major copyright owners, there-
fore, would be "unwise. ' 85 The court's advice to the plaintiffs in layman's
terms: "Relax and things will likely work out now as they have in the
past."
determination of the basic legal issue originally posed by them, this is precluded since a
fact issue is raised." Id.
79. In Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, the court reasoned that defendant's "knowledge, or
lack of knowledge, of the actual infringement does not alter the fact that he caused the
infringement" in finding the president/director and major shareholder of company produc-
ing infringing records liable. 285 F. Supp. 798, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
80. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1166 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated




84. Id. at 1167.
85. Id. at 1166.
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VI. THE DOCTRINAL STANDARDS EXPLORED
A. FIXED VERBAL FORMULAE
Amid these forces driving expansion of the concepts, the lawyer's im-
pulse to organize and rationalize has produced settled standards for both
contributory and vicarious infringement. Whatever might follow, we now
know that every case will begin with a recitation of the verbal formula for
contributory infringement laid out in Gershwin, or some equivalent
thereof:
[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may
be held liable as a "contributory" infringer. 86
And likewise with the verbal formula for vicarious infringement set
forth in H.L. Green, or some equivalent thereof:
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and
direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materi-
als-even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright mo-
nopoly is being impaired ... the purposes of copyright law may be
best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of
that exploitation. 87
The articulation of the standards is at this point set dogma. These stan-
dards have been repeated often enough by so many circuits that any ef-
forts to argue that an element stated is not required or to mix and match
elements to craft a new basis of liability is likely doomed from the
outset.88
A detailed discussion follows exploring how these standards and their
component elements-knowledge and contributory acts for contributory
infringement and right and ability to control and direct financial benefit
in the case of vicarious liability-have been interpreted and applied in
ever-expansive readings and circumstances with respect to traditional me-
dia. The purpose of the exercise is to define the shape of these standards
as they have evolved and will ultimately be applied to technological inno-
vations generally and to highlight the unique challenges of computer
networks.
86. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
87. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1963)
(internal citations omitted).
88. In Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 291 (S.D.N.Y 1988), a plaintiff
grasping to extend liability for infringement of architectural plans to the real estate brokers
who sold the land on which the infringing house was built argued that "knowledge" and
"financial benefit," taken together, could be the basis for indirect copyright liability. In
effect, the plaintiff, faced with very weak facts, sought to mix and match contributory and
vicarious liability elements into a new Frankenstein standard. Id. at 294. The court, apply-
ing the now well-worn standards for vicarious and contributory liability, found the case
lacking under each and refused to articulate a new hybrid knowledge-plus-control standard
under which the defendant could be found liable. Id.
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B. Tim REQUIREMENT OF AN UNDERLYING INFRINGEMENT
It should be axiomatic that a finding of any form of indirect liability
requires an actual, underlying infringement as a preliminary matter.89
The defendant cannot logically be liable for the acts of a third party, if
that third party did nothing wrong and many cases have so held that an
underlying direct infringement is a prerequisite for any type of indirect
liability. 90 In the early cases, courts were careful to find an actual in-
fringement of the plaintiff's work by the direct infringer before moving
onto a contributory or vicarious liability analysis.91 Thus, in the bedrock
Gershwin case, a specific performance of a specific Gershwin composition
("Bess, You is My Woman Now") was the focal point of the case, even
though the case asked the much broader question of whether a talent
agency could avoid paying copyright liability by creating and managing
subordinate neighborhood concert organizations that formally arranged
for the concerts at which the infringing works were to be played.92 Like-
wise, the court in Fromont was evaluating the performance of two of
plaintiff's works ("Prelude" and "Claire de la Lune") on October 13,
1917, even though the case dealt with the broader problem of when a
concert hall owner ought to be liable for infringing performances on his
premises. 93 The Gershwin and Fromont cases are not atypical. In the
typical case of yore, the plaintiff would establish particular acts of in-
fringements of the works it owns, even if it had to have an investigator
solicit and document specific infringements of specific works on specific
dates.94 Plaintiffs went to such lengths, sometimes documenting the in-
89. David Nimmer concurs that the logic of contributory and vicarious infringement
require an underlying finding of direct infringement by a third party. NIMMER, supra note
9, § 12.03[A][4]. However, it could be argued that the act of "authorizing" is an indepen-
dent form of contributory infringement whether or not the supposed licensee actually in-
fringes or not. But see Danjaq, S.A. v. MOM/UA Communications Co., 773 F. Supp 194,
201 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (citing NIMMER in finding that "authorization" alone does not estab-
lish the necessary direct infringement predicate for a finding of contributory infringement).
90. See e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 (1984);
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 293 F.3d 1004, 1013 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Secondary
liability for copyright infringement does not exist in the absence of direct infringement by a
third party."); Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829,
845 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Contributory infringement necessarily must follow a finding of di-
rect or primary infringement"); Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada TIG, Inc., 855 F.
Supp. 1314, 1322 (D. Mass. 1994) (explaining that an underlying third-party infringement is
required for a finding of indirect liability); Danjaq, 773 F. Supp. at 201 ("Contributory
infringement, under this [the Gershwin] standard, does not lie without primary
infringement.").
91. See Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1322 (discussing that "courts in
these early cases [citing H.L. Green Co. and Gershwin among others] were careful to find
an actual infringement by the alleged direct infringer.").
92. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1160 (2d
Cir. 1971) (defendant concedes that "on January 9, 1965 concert artists managed by [defen-
dant] performed 'Bess, You is My Woman Now' publicly for profit at a concert sponsored
by the Port Washington Community Concert Association without the permission of plain-
tiff Gershwin Publishing Company ... ").
93. Fromont v. Aeolian Co., 254 F. 592, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
94. Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821, 822-23
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (basing its decision on the findings of plaintiff's investigator, the court
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fringement at issue down to whether a copyright notice was present on
work, presumably because the courts took quite seriously the require-
ment that there be a direct infringement of plaintiff's work for the defen-
dant to be found indirectly liable for that instance of infringement. 95
As discussed above, the composers and publishers represented by AS-
CAP have waged a long battle to force either the sale of their licenses or
establish copyright liability, direct or indirect, without identifying the
works at issue. Whether or not caused by the efforts of performing rights
societies or entertainment trade groups, courts have more recently elided
or ignored completely the identification of specific infringements of plain-
tiff's work in indirect liability cases. 96 Under the approach of more re-
cent indirect liability cases, specific acts of infringement of specific works
is not as important as what type of potentially infringing activity was go-
ing on more generally. In contrast to the approach of Gershwin which
tried the legitimacy of an entire business structure based on the occur-
rence of single, documented infringement, the current trend is to satisfy
the requirement of an underlying direct infringement with general aver-
ments to the nature of defendant's activity, the quanta of copyrighted
works apparently involved and the percentage of such works owned by
the plaintiffs. 97 Indeed, the finding of underlying infringement as worded
in such cases often seems to extend beyond the copyrights asserted by the
plaintiffs. 98 In the typical suit, major content owners establish that they
own a large body of content by submitting a list of hundreds of copy-
righted works and then directly establish through investigative evidence
that some sampling of plaintiff's works were infringed. The analysis then
moves to the general treatment of copyrighted works by defendant's
technology or business structure without reference to the specific in-
"finds that on 14 separate occasions on specific dates between March 7 and April 17, 1973
at least eight of plaintiff's copyrighted musical sound recordings were copied on Make-A-
Tapes installed in defendants' stores ... by representatives of plaintiffs posing as custom-
ers"); Chappel & Co, Inc. v. Frankel, 285 F. Supp. 798, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (only four
specified compositions out of ninety-six in total were on music compilation records pro-
duced by the defendant).
95. RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., 594 F. Supp. 335, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that
"on three occasions plaintiffs' agents walked into defendant's store, handed defendant's
salesperson a pre-recorded copyrighted tape on which the copyright symbols were clearly
displayed" and obtained a copy from defendant of such work).
96. See Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1322 (contrasting specificity of find-
ing of underlying direct infringement in older cases versus the failure of more recent courts
to explain the basis of liability as carefully). In Polygram, the court found, notwithstanding
the modern trend toward laxity, that the plaintiff must meet its burden of proof on the
issue of an unauthorized performance for a copyright action, direct or indirect, to go for-
ward. Id.
97. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding
that plaintiffs had met their burden of demonstrating a copyright infringement with evi-
dence showing that significant percentage of works downloaded on the Napster system
were protected by copyrights owned or administered by the plaintiffs).
98. A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp 1449, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding
that defendant's customers engaged "in a substantial amount of counterfeiting and trade-
mark infringement, including the 156 copyrighted sound recordings" asserted by plaintiffs,





Focusing on specific acts of infringement versus establishing a general
milieu of infringement, including violation of some of the plaintiff's
works, are arguably two equally sufficient ways of cracking the same
nut-the question of whether the plaintiff suffered a violation of its copy-
right. However, the shift in approach may have a practical effect in the
way courts approach indirect liability. The careful establishment of direct
infringement of a plaintiff's specific works before moving into any indi-
rect liability analysis in the older cases kept the focus on actual acts of
copyright infringement as the primary/significant concern before looking
at whether it is just to hold another liable for that infringement. Eliding
over the essential, first step of direct infringement engenders analyses
that focus on the general culpability or "contribution" of a defendant to
infringement generally. The modern analysis tends not to be whether the
talent agency is liable for an infringing performance of "Bess, You is My
Woman Now," but whether a talent agency may, as a general matter, use
local concert organizations without obtaining licenses. The distinction is
subtle, but the latter approach more easily breeds loose rationales, de-
tached from the facts, and blurs the significant distinction between actual
infringement and secondary liability for such infringement.100
C. THE STANDARD FOR CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
Contributory infringement cases have historically focused on tradi-
tional piracy operations, the appropriate use of duplication equipment,
and business structures apparently designed to avoid liability. Contribu-
tory liability has been found, for example, where a retail outlet provided
original copyrighted tapes and blank tapes for use in duplication equip-
ment on the premises (Elektra),101 where a retail service provider would
99. In Napster, for example, the district court reasoned that because a majority of
Napster users use the service to download music and the plaintiffs collectively own the
copyrights to a large portion of commercially available music, "the uses constitute direct
infringement of the plaintiffs' musical compositions, recordings." A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., No. C 99-5183 MHP, 00-0074 MHP, 2000 WL 1009483, at * 1 (N.D. Cal. July
26, 2000) (transcript of proceedings). Similarly, the district court in Grokster proceeded to
examine secondary copyright liability on a motion for summary judgment where "it is un-
disputed that at least some of the individuals who use Defendants' software are engaged in
direct copyright infringement of Plaintiffs' copyrighted works." MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (C.D. Cal 2003). It is, however, worth noting that
the court in Grokster did pay attention to the need for a predicate direct infringement to an
anachronistic extent, devoting an entire section of the opinion to the inquiry, even if it
ultimately required little specificity for the allegations of and evidence supporting direct
infringement. Id.
100. One could also argue that the fact-specific approach in the older cases could un-
dermine indirect liability as an effective means of preventing the evasion of copyright lia-
bility. The older, more detailed approach may have trouble handling a system in which
direct infringement is pervasive, but hard to pin down to specific acts, due to the speed and
transient nature of the activity, the sheer mass of activity in which a single infringement of
a single work may be embedded, or other reasons. Still, it is difficult to imagine many
scenarios in which demonstration of actual infringement would be impossible.
101. See generally Electra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs., 360 F. Supp. 821
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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duplicate copyrighted tapes upon a customers request (RCA),10 2 where
defendants created and broadcasted ads and distributed a bootleg record
(Screen Gems),103 where a defendant timed copyrighted works and sold
time-loaded blank cassettes along with duplication machines and other
necessities for others to create counterfeits (Abdallah),'°4 where a defen-
dant manufactured, sold and actively promoted a TV satellite descram-
bler chip (Cable/Home Communications),10 5 where defendants operated
a swap meet notorious for the sale of infringing records (Fonovisa)10 6
and, of course, where a talent agency creates and manages neighborhood
organizations that hold concerts at which infringing performances take
place (Gershwin).107
The two critical elements springing from the Gershwin standard are (1)
knowledge and (2) some material contribution to the infringement.10 8
Each will be discussed in turn.
1. Breakdown of Knowledge in the Tangible World
Presumably the "knowledge" element serves the foundational policy of
fairness. If the defendant knew of the wrongful acts of the direct in-
fringer and did not modify his behavior, he is culpable and should pay.
The clarity of that message, however, does little to define what level of
knowledge, of what subject matter, by whom and at what time establishes
the requisite level of culpability or otherwise justifies transferring liability
to that party. The older, bedrock cases provide little discussion of the
"knowledge" required. 10 9 Still, certain generalizations may be gleaned
from the cases.
a. "Infringing Activity"
The most fundamental inquiry in examining the knowledge element of
the test is understanding what is the contemplated object of the defen-
dant's knowledge-what must the defendant know. We know from the
Gershwin standard that the object of the knowledge is the "infringing
activity."" 0 "Infringing activity," however, could refer to knowledge of
102. See generally RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
103. See generally Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
104. See generally A&M Records v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
105. See generally Cable[Home Communications Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc. 902 F.2d
829 (11th Cir. 1990).
106. See generally, Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
107. See generally, Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
108. Id. at 1162.
109. The more recent cases dealing with P2P file sharing and other computer networks,
to be discussed in the second part of this study provide a good deal more detail on the type
of knowledge required, some of it conflicting with the standards implicit in the older cases
discussed in this section.
110. See id. at 1162. The contributory infringement standard has more recently been
restated as imposing liability where "one person knowingly contributes to the infringing
conduct of another." Fonovisa, Inc., 16 F.3d at 264. This phrasing, sneaking the knowledge
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the specific acts of infringement of a plaintiff's asserted copyrights, any
knowledge that a plaintiff's copyrights are being infringed, or a more gen-
eralized knowledge that infringement of a certain type is taking place.
Perhaps even knowledge that infringement may be or is likely to be tak-
ing place will suffice.
While the older cases dealing with tangible media do not offer a set,
verbal formulation or much explicit guidance on the meaning of "infring-
ing activity," courts historically tend to find the knowledge element satis-
fied if the defendant had a general knowledge that infringement of the
sort alleged is likely taking place.11' The plaintiff need not show that the
defendant knew that the plaintiff's particular copyrights were being in-
fringed or which specific acts resulted in the direct infringement at
issue. 112
Thus, in Gershwin, the relevant knowledge cited was the defendant's
knowledge that its artists included copyrighted compositions in their per-
formances without a license to do so.1 13 The Gershwin court thought the
relevant knowledge in the prior Screen Gems case was the defendant's
knowledge that the compilation record at issue was infringing without
element in as an adverb modifying a larger clause, creates some confusion as to what the
object of the knowledge must be-"contribution," "infringing conduct" or both? Though
the Fonovisa decision from the Ninth Circuit is one of the more important contributory
infringement cases, the analysis above will assume that this court was merely trying to
rephrase, even if carelessly, the Gershwin standard, not modify its essential characteristics.
111. More recent cases dealing with new technologies and computer networks in partic-
ular that will be discussed at length in the sequel to this article take a much tougher and
ostensibly inconsistent line, requiring actual knowledge of a specific infringement at a time
when remedial action is possible. See e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,
1021 (9th Cir. 2001); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374(N.D. Cal. 1995). These cases from Sony forward expressly reject the sufficiency of con-
structive knowledge. However, in practice, this tighter verbal formulation arguably has not
raised the evidentiary hurdle for plaintiffs or otherwise impacted ultimate results. The
court in UMG Recordings v. Sinnott all but recognizes the divergent standards for knowl-
edge, striving mightily to explain why the looser standard of knowledge developed in tangi-
ble media cases such as Fonovisa and finding expression with respect to technology in
Napster ought to apply, while the more exacting standards expressed in RTC v. Netcom
and more recently, Grokster should not apply. See UMG Recordings v. Sinnott, 300 F.
Supp. 2d 993, 998 (E.D. Cal. 2004). The court does not address why it is appropriate to
have different standards of knowledge in the same rule to be applied selectively depending
on the technology or business arrangement at issue.
112. The Eastern District of California, the first court to rule on the merits of contribu-
tory infringement claim against a flea market operator, expressly rejected the defendant's
contention that actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement is required to satisfy
the "knowledge" prong of contributory liability. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 998. The court
did not add much to the prior cases in stating affirmatively what type of knowledge will
suffice as it based its finding that the knowledge prong was met largely on constructive
knowledge and knowledge that ought to be imputed as a result of defendant's willful igno-
rance. Id. at 999. "Knowledge" in Sinnott, as in the more widely cited flea market opinion,
Fonovisa, could only be disputed in the most legalistic sense as the facts revealed numerous
cease and desist letters, visits from plaintiffs investigators and other efforts to inform the
defendant more fully. Id. at 999-1000. As the court put it, "Sinnott purposefully refused to
witness the infringement, and chose not to act on the personal notification he received.
This does not allow him to disavow knowledge of the infringement, however." Id. at 1000.
113. Gershwin Publ'g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162-63.
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requiring greater specificity as to which compositions infringed whose
copyrights. 114 In Abdallah, the knowledge that mattered was the defen-
dant's awareness of the "counterfeiting activities" of the customers to
whom the defendant provided tapes and duplication equipment.
1 5
With that said, broad generalizations regarding the knowledge standard
remain problematic. The difficulty arises from the sloppiness of prior
courts, so one should be cautious in reading too much into the happen-
stance of phrasing. Moreover, different objects of knowledge of varying
specificity may be appropriate in different situations. If, for example, an
isolated act or ongoing activity that only implicates one work or a discrete
body of works is at issue the knowledge required would arguably need to
be more specific than that in a large-scale, ongoing operation that impli-
cates wide-ranging copyright infringement." 6
b. An Objective Standard
It is now accepted with black-letter status that the standard for assess-
ing knowledge is objective, that is, whether the defendant knew or had
reason to know of the infringing activity. 117 This objective standard is
alternatively phrased in cases as "actual or apparent knowledge" 118 or
actual or "constructive knowledge." 119 An objective knowledge standard
precludes people from shunting liability with studied and contrived, even
if actual, ignorance.
c. When and by Whom
The older, tangible media cases generally leave open the critical ques-
tions of whose knowledge counts and when the knowledge must be ob-
114. Id. at 1162.
115. A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
116. In ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Cal. Authority of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 866
(E.D. Cal. 1992), for example, what mattered was whether the defendant knew they were
specifically infringing plaintiff's copyright. There, however, the only act at issue was the
ongoing re-transmission of plaintiffs television broadcasts of horse races. Presumably, the
defendant horse track was not otherwise in the business of re-routing television signals, or
at least, not a significantly large number of different signals. The "knowledge" required
accordingly had to be specific to the re-transmission of plaintiffs broadcast. ITSI TV., 785
F. Supp. at 866. In Fromont, what mattered was the specific works of the plaintiff were
played at a single piano concert because the playing of the pieces alone was the subject of
the plaintiff copyright owner's complaint. Fromont v. Aeolian Co., 254 F. 592 (S.D.N.Y.
1918).
117. The objective standard for knowledge, here, as in most areas of the law, appears
reasonable on its face. A defendant need not be rewarded for having a mind askew by
nature, or, more importantly for theories of indirect liability, studiously maintained blank.
An objective standard effectively modifies the standard from one prohibiting affirmative
bad acts to one precluding negligent behavior. Instead of a negative injunction not to take
action when one knows that it will aid or result in an illegal act, we have a positive require-
ment to meet an objective standard in those actions.
118. Cable/Home Communications Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 846
(11th Cir. 1990).
119. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 262 (5th Cir. 1988).
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tained or implied.120 As to when the knowledge must be obtained by the
relevant mind or imputed to an organization, the large purpose of fair-
ness could only be served if the knowledge antedates the infringing activ-
ity at issue. The plaintiff has a great deal of power in overcoming any
timing hurdle by providing notice of the infringement in a cease and de-
sist or similar letter prior to commencing suit.
The court may then point to the notice given as evidence of knowledge.
It is possible that notice takes place as early as receipt. A prior notice, as
in the Fonovisal l and Sinnott122 cases, raise questions of its own. How
specific must the notice be? In the typical case involving a large consor-
tium of content owner plaintiffs, the notice will contain a statement of the
gross quanta of content of the sort at issue that is owned by plaintiff
group, will assert the general problem of infringement, and then will doc-
ument what they consider several illustrative specific instances of in-
fringement established by an inspector or other agent of plaintiff.'23 The
traditional media cases offer little guidance as to how such a letter im-
pacts the "knowledge" of the defendant for purposes of indirect copy-
right liability or what remedial acts in response to such a notice will avoid
liability.
The timing of the knowledge relative to the actual infringement is also
of importance to the extent a court emphasizes the policing rationale. If
the opportunity to police is paramount, the defendant must have knowl-
edge in a time frame that permits remedial action to prevent the infringe-
ment or otherwise remove himself from the enterprise.124
d. An Expansive and Recent Standard
The dominant concept of an "infringing activity" in the historical pre-
cedent is extremely broad. If one operates a self-service copy center,
120. Many cases involve either individual defendants or principal players within an or-
ganization, allowing the court to avoid the harder question of what knowledge in whose
heads should be imputed to an entity as a whole. Although this is an extremely difficult
question, copyright can borrow on the very rich and refined caselaw that has evolved over
similar questions in the tort and criminal context.
121. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 16 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
122. UMG Recordings v. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d 993 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
123. The Ninth Circuit opinion in Sony (reversed by the Supreme Court) was satisfied
that Sony had the requisite knowledge because reproducing copyrighted materials was
"the most conspicuous use of the product" and the "source of the product's consumer
appeal." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 975 (9th Cir.
1981). It seemed to require very little in the way of knowledge of specific acts of direct
infringement of plaintiffs work, finding it sufficient to note that the "Betamax will be used
to reproduce copyrighted material, some of which appellants own" and that the standard
looks to knowledge of "infringing activity" generally, not specific acts. Id.
124. In analyzing the closely-related issue of the sufficiency of a copyright owner's no-
tice to an ISP under the DMCA, the court in Verizon placed great emphasis on the fact
that the notice did not reach in any single instance in time for the ISP to take remedial
action. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229,
1236 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Arguably, the policy considerations under the DMCA, which has
highly specific, lengthy requirements for conforming notices, differ by Congressional de-
sign. However, broadly viewed, the interests involved and issues are the same as those in
cases of secondary copyright liability that take place in the off-line world.
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surely he knows that a good deal of infringement is taking place-cus-
tomers copy news articles, even sections of books that are too large for
fair use comfort. The standard (if not stated, at least implied) in the
older, non-technical cases would, as a practical matter, condemn this use-
ful service. As the Ninth Circuit scoffed in its soon-to-be-reversed Sony
opinion, which reflected the approach up to that point, "[t]he corporate
appellees [Sony and its retailers] know that the Betamax will be used to
reproduce copyrighted materials. In fact, that is the most conspicuous use
of the product. That use is intended, expected, encouraged, and the
source of the product's consumer appeal."'1 25 This broad approach is
somewhat odd, given that it is difficult to find a traditional media case
where the findings of fact do not make a plaintiff's actual knowledge of
specific acts of infringements of a plaintiff's copyrights clear.
126
When the loose meaning of "infringing activity" is coupled with an ob-
jective outlook that permits imputing knowledge that a defendant should
have, the standard loosens even more. Even in the absence of actual
knowledge, surely the owner of a copy service ought to know that in-
fringement is taking place with the aid of his machines. Although actual
knowledge of specific infringing acts seems to be the factual norm in
traditional media cases, the objective standard has been used to impute
knowledge to more loosely connected actors from a miasma of circum-
stances. In Screen Gems, for example, the court found that knowledge
could be imputed to an advertising agency because its client, the direct
infringer, bore the "well known indicia of the fly-by-night operator-
smallness, lack of permanent location and financial unreliability" and the
125. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d at 975.
126. In Gershwin, the defendant, a talent agency in New York sophisticated in the ways
of the music business, printed the concert programs listing the infringing works to be per-
formed. Gershwin Publ'g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1161. The defendant also knew, due to its
close involvement with organizing the concerts and the finances of the concerts that copy-
right license fees were not being paid by the local organizations, the artists or themselves.
Id. In A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, the defendant timed and on occasion assisted with
reproduction of the insert card of the original copyrighted works in the process of produc-
ing pirated music recordings. 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1453-55 (C.D. Cal. 1996). In Cable/Home
Communications, a defendant held conferences outside the United States for the express
purpose of avoiding jurisdiction for hawking his descrambler chips. Cable/Home Commu-
nications Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 837-38 (11th Cir. 1990).
In Fonovisa, a recent case almost inevitably relied upon to support a broad reading of
contributory infringement, the court found a flea market contributorily liable for the sale
of counterfeit records by a third-party vendor. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 16
F.3d 257 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the specific knowledge of the flea market operator was
clear. Id. at 261, 264. After numerous cease and desist letters, police raids and confisca-
tions as well as the instigation of litigation, the court found that there was "no dispute for
purposes of this appeal that Cherry Auction [the flea market operator/defendant] and its
operators were aware that vendors in their swap meet were selling counterfeit record-
ings .. " Id. at 261. Indeed, it is difficult to find a traditional media case in which the
defendant's acts were not so close to the direct infringement that actual knowledge of
specific acts of infringement clearly existed. In many cases, the defendant likely knew that
the copyright was owned or controlled by the plaintiff. If the defendant did not actually
know that plaintiff was the owner of the copyrighted work, the presence of a copyright
notice often makes imputing even this level of detail to the defendant's knowledge.
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album advertised was suspiciously inexpensive.12 7
Strangely, this broad reading of knowledge appears to be of rather re-
cent origin or acceptance, even though it seems to be implicit in some of
the most important law-making precedent. In its Sony decision, the Su-
preme Court explained that the defendant's liability would necessarily
rest on a finding that the defendant sold equipment with "constructive
knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. ' 128 The Court stated
bluntly in 1984, "[t]here is no precedent in the law of copyright for the
imposition of vicarious liability [read secondary liability] on such a the-
ory."'21 9 It is not clear whether the Court was taking issue with basing
liability on constructive knowledge, or the loose object of the defendant's
knowledge (that "customers may use" the equipment to infringe).
Whether the Court was taking issue with the novel breadth of the asser-
tion of liability on the first, second or both matters taken together, it is
clear that the Hollywood plaintiffs' assertion that constructive knowledge
of infringement taking place is sufficient for a finding of contributory in-
fringement, was strikingly novel and broad to the Court in 1984.130
There is no single, obvious answer as to why the standard for knowl-
edge that evolved is so broad on its face. Surely, the general desire of
courts to articulate generalized standards for future use is at work. The
courts have suggested that knowledge can be general even though ex-
tremely specific knowledge is present in so many of the major cases. The
broad policies are certainly in play when the courts seek to define these
standards-bringing in the reasonable man which is always so useful in
tort analyses. The cases may take a broad approach to ensure that the
standard can reach even the most creative bad actors, even though such
standards rarely appear to be necessary because the defendants in the
reported cases are usually demonstrably bad.
127. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 404(S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court also saw a basis for finding the ad agency had sufficient knowl-
edge in the fact that the ad agency had inquired as to whether the counterfeiters had ob-
tained releases from the record companies. Id. Imputing knowledge from what would
ordinarily be considered a defendant's vigilance and expressed desire to comport with cop-
yright restrictions seems to undermine the policy of encouraging self-policing by holding a
failed, even if good faith, effort against the defendant.
128. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 439.
129. Id.
130. But see id. at 487. The dissenters argued "[a] finding of contributory infringement
has never depended on actual knowledge of particular instances of infringement; it is suffi-
cient that the defendant have reason to know that substantial infringement is taking place"(citing Screen Gems and the dance hall cases in support). Id. It is difficult to assess the
overall merit of the dissenters' argument here for purposes of the specific analysis of the
knowledge element in contributory copyright infringement. As the citation to the dance
hall cases makes clear, the dissenters make no conceptual distinction between the vicarious
liability and contributory infringement theories, casting doubt on any efforts to parse the
language of the court too finely. Still, the surprise of the Court is somewhat odd given that
the standard-setting Gershwin cites Screen Gems approvingly for holding a defendant "lia-
ble as a 'contributory' infringer if it were shown to have had knowledge, or reason to know,
of the infringing nature of the records." Gershwin Publ'g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162.
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Though there is no overt discussion of the issue in the case precedents,
the courts could be grappling with the problems presented by the use of
"knowledge" as a limiting factor. While the defendant's knowledge that
his acts were bad is essential to serve the goal of fairness, it presents diffi-
cult problems in practical application. Taking the "'knowledge" element
seriously can make crafting any sort of prospective remedy difficult to
farcical. In one case, for example, a retail copy center was enjoined from
selling "blank cassette tapes which defendant knows or has reason to be-
lieve will be used in reproducing plaintiffs' copyrighted sound record-
ings.' 131 While the language in this injunction tracks the legal standard
for contributory infringement, incorporating the knowledge element
seems to provide an unrealistic, even if legally correct remedy.
132 It
presumes that a thinking agent of the defendant copy center is making
case-by-case choices whether or not to sell blank tapes, not just ringing up
customers who are waiting in line.1 33 Even if the copy center employees
were empowered to make such judgments, it is unclear when, if ever, they
would have such knowledge about a customer's doings. 134 If the defen-
dant copy center's duplication machines at issue in the case were self ser-
vice, such that customers merely turned in a counting device which
quantified the customer's use of a machine, it may be impossible to show
knowledge. The net effect of taking knowledge seriously may be an ex-
ceedingly thin injunction, even where ongoing infringement is clearly es-
tablished, as would likely be the case in a copy center that sold blank
cassettes and access to duplication equipment. This practical concern
may be on the minds of trial judges when grappling with and frequently
expanding or quickly eliding the requirement of knowledge. 135
2. Breakdown of Contributory Acts
In keeping with the analogy to joint and several liability for joint
tortfeasors, contributory infringement requires some substantial partici-
pation in the infringement, the act or acts for which the contributory in-
fringer is secondarily liable. To use the language of the Gershwin
standard, the contributory infringer must "induce, cause or materially
contribute" to the infringing conduct of another.' 36 Relative to the




135. As discussed above, in at least one case, a record company plaintiff convinced a
court that contributory infringement did not require any showing of knowledge. Chappell
& Co. v. Frankel, 285 F. Supp. 798, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). With the overwhelming force of
subsequent decisions which adopt the standard set forth in Gershwin, this case must be
viewed as an aberrant outlier. It does, however, support the point that knowledge, if taken
seriously, can make reaching the desired result difficult and courts are frequently eager to
find a way around the limitation. The global solution of the Chappell court, of eliminate
the requirement of knowledge, simply was too broad and perhaps too obvious for other
courts to adopt.
136. Gershwin Publ'g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162.
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knowledge element, there is a fair amount of black letter law giving shape
to what sort of contribution suffices.
The material contribution, cause or inducement of infringement may
take the form of either (a) "personal conduct that encourages or assists
the infringement" or (b) "provision of machinery or goods that facilitate
the infringement. ' 137 Alternatively, contributory acts have been parsed
into (x) acts made with the purpose of providing direct assistance in expe-
diting the underlying infringement or (y) acts to provide the means or
facilities for the admitted copying.138 For the purposes of applying indi-
rect liability theories to computer networks, the primary subject of the
companion to this article, From Sony to Grokster, The Failure of the Cop-
yright Doctrines of Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Liability to
Resolve the War Between Content and Destructive Technologies, providing
the site and facilities for the infringement, is to date the most important
category of contributory acts under the current cases. 139
It is often stated that the contribution must be "material" or "substan-
tial.' 140 "One must make more than a 'mere quantitative contribution' to
the primary infringement in order to be liable on a theory of contributory
liability.' 141 The contribution must also have some direct relationship
with the acts of infringement. The contributory acts at issue must bear
some direct relationship to the infringing acts and be made in concert
with the direct infringer.142 Put simply, the traditional articulation of the
theory required the contributory infringer to participate substantially and
directly in the direct infringement at issue.
a. The Typical Case-Participation in Piracy
In the typical contributory infringement case, the defendant is an active
participant in commercial piracy or a scheme to avoid copyright liability.
The substantiality of the defendant's activities and the directness of the
relationship are accordingly not significantly at issue in such a case. The
137. Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Pub'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that use of West's "star pagination" system in Bender's CD ROM versions of judicial
opinions did not contributorily infringe West's copyright in the organization of its judicial
opinion reporters).
138. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.N.Y 1988).
139. Craig A. Grossman, From Sony to Grokster, The Failure of the Copyright Doc-
trines of Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Liability to Resolve the War Between
Content and Destructive Technologies, 53 BuFF. L. REV. 141 (on file with author).
140. The Gershwin standard states that the contributory infringer is one who "materi-
ally contributes" to the underlying infringement. In holding real estate brokers not liable
for the infringement of architectural plans contemplated by the buyers of a property, the
Demetriades court explains that liability can only attach to "substantial involvement" with
the infringement. Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 294. The Demetriades court cited the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) which establishes third-party enterprise liability when
one knows of another's tortious conduct and substantially aids or encourages that en-
deavor. Id. (emphasis in Demetriades opinion).
141. ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Cal. Authority of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 861 (E.D.
Cal. 1992) (quoting Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 (quoting Fortnightly Corp. v. United Art-
ists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 396-97 (1968)).
142. N. Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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defendant is often a bad actor responsible for essential aspects of the
counterfeiting business under scrutiny. In Abdallah, timing original copy-
righted works, selling time-loaded blank cassettes and copy equipment,
and providing financing and a network of other service providers to pro-
duce marketable counterfeits sufficed as contributory acts.143 In the stan-
dard-setting Gershwin case, the talent agency's "pervasive participation"
in the "concert creation" activities of local concert organizations suf-
ficed. 144 One case is a classic piracy operation, the other a scheme
architected to avoid liability.
In order to prevent schemers from avoiding liability with clever organi-
zational or corporate structures, courts take a functional, practical ap-
proach to assessing the relationship of the conduct to the infringement.
Courts will not get hung up on whether a system is set up so that another
party provides the original copyrighted work for duplication or someone
else puts the tape in the machine or pushes the button. Courts tend to
take a practical view of what is going on, looking at an organization or
operation as a whole, instead of thinly slicing the circumstances into com-
ponent acts, each of which may be tied to a different actor. 145
There is very little caselaw on how direct or substantial an act must be.
For the most part, these requirements are not even recited and seem to
play a part only in the rare reported case in which contributory infringe-
ment is not found.146
143. A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1451 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
144. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1163 (2d
Cir. 1971).
145. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting
that defendant rented video cassettes and equipped rooms for viewing those cassettes);
Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. at 1453 (noting that defendant was sole owner of a corporation
which sold "time-loaded" audio tapes who on occasion even timed the copyrighted works
to be copied, and assisted with financing and other arrangements required to produce
counterfeit cassettes); RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335, 340 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (noting that defendant copy service operated a "Rezound" cassette copying machine
and would duplicate copyrighted cassettes for customers); Elektra Records Co. v. Gem
Elec. Distribs., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (noting that defendants leased and
operated coin-operated "Make-A-Tape" machines which duplicated copyrighted 8-Track
music recordings); Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 399, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (noting that defendant advertising agency helped promote
bootleg compilation album).
146. Demetriades is the rare case which draws the line around contributory acts that will
suffice. Although the defendants clearly knew about their clients' contemplated infringe-
ment of architectural plans in connection with a sale of land, and indeed such infringement
was effectively a condition of the sale, the court found the involvement of the defendant
real estate broker too remote and insubstantial for purposes of contributory infringement.
Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). In Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, No. C 04-0371 JW, 2004 WL 1773349, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5,
2004), discussed infra, the court found that credit card service companies were too tangen-
tially related to the infringement of a web site operator for infringement to attach. These
are indeed rare examples of courts circumscribing the limits of contributory copyright in-
fringement via the material contribution prong, the only ones of their kind unearthed by
the research for this article.
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b. Site and Facilities are Enough
Any limitations placed on the nature of contributory acts have been
largely superseded by the 9th Circuit's Fonovisa decision.147 In this
widely adopted decision, the court held that a flea market operator was
liable for the sale of counterfeit records by a third-party vendor who sold
its wares at the flea market. 148 The relevant contributory acts in the view
of the court were the "support services provided by the swap meet," in-
cluding the "provision of space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing
and customers.' 49 The Ninth Circuit rejected the approach of the district
court which required some showing that the defendant expressly pro-
moted or encouraged the sale of counterfeit products. 150 The decision
does not directly address the issues of how substantial or directly related
the contribution needs to be.151 It seems that Fonovisa establishes an
implicit rule that providing the site or facilities for infringement is a sub-
stantial and direct enough participation for establishing contributory lia-
bility.152 While the Fonovisa approach certainly serves the interest of
incentivizing self-policing, it does so by a tremendous loosening of the
legal standard, presumptively roping in third-parties for providing ser-
vices and facilities only tangentially related to the infringement at issue,
such as a parking lot and toilets. Landlords and perhaps even gardeners,
plumbers and trash collectors who offer their services to likely infringers
may be on the hook for providing sufficient site, facilities or "support
services."1 53
c. Defendant's Intent as a Factor
Under the traditional articulation of the test, as well as its expansion in
Fonovisa, the intent of the defendant may be an important limitation. It
has long been agreed that acts with the purpose of encouraging or fur-
thering the infringement can serve as the basis for contributory infringe-
ment, with the defendant's volition linking the defendant's acts to the
infringement and, of course, serving the cause of fairness. This standard
applies to the normal case of piracy in which a defendant actively and
intentionally participates in the piracy scheme. In a site, facilities and
support services analysis, intent may play a role as well. In attempting to
distinguish the acts of the swap meet at issue from those of the normal,
passive landlord, the Fonovisa court explained that the swap meet, pre-
sumably unlike a normal landlord, "actively strives to provide the envi-
ronment and the market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive.' 54
Thus, the subjective intent of the party providing the "support services"
147. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).





153. See, e.g. id.
154. Id. at 264.
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may serve to limit the vast breadth of a rule that otherwise sweeps in
parking services, water and sewage services, security services and the
many other services required to make a site a clean, safe and pleasant
place to be for any purpose, not just infringement. It should be under-
stood, however, that the research for this article revealed no court deci-
sion which has expressly limited the standard by defendant's bad intent
where providing the site, facilities and support services were the contribu-
tory acts at issue. If such a limitation exists, it is implicit and the only
textual link is the "actively strives" language of Fonovisa.155
d. Timing and Remedial Action
As with knowledge, there is an issue of notice with respect to whether
the provision of a site, facilities and services supports a finding of liability.
Because contributory infringement is not generally considered a strict lia-
bility theory, a defendant can presumably avoid liability by taking some
form of prompt action that purges its connection to the infringement
upon receiving notice of the infringement. Here, too, the cases are
largely silent, however. 156
e. A Gross Expansion
The expansion and breadth of the analysis for contributory acts paral-
lels the breadth of the knowledge standard. It should be kept in mind
that contributory infringement had humble, limited beginnings-holding
a party liable for purporting to authorize the exploitation of another's
work. The Supreme Court in Sony explicitly rejected plaintiff's argument
that "supplying the 'means' to accomplish an infringing activity and en-
couraging that activity through advertisement are sufficient to establish
liability for copyright infringement."'1 57 "This argument," the majority
explained, "rests on a gross generalization that cannot withstand scru-
tiny."'158 For decades, the paradigm for contributory liability remained
schemers of various kind trying to avoid license payments or to profit
from counterfeiting activities without getting sufficient dirt on their hands
to establish liability under the strictures of the copyright statute.
Nonetheless, pushed by the expansive analogy to tort and the practical
need for standards wide enough to accommodate new duplication tech-
nologies and business models surrounding the use of such equipment,
155. Id.
156. The significant exception is Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom and its tech-oriented
progeny, to be discussed in the companion piece to this article. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995). The court in Netcom fashions a notice-and-take-down regime to permit the
continued operation of online services notwithstanding its facilitation of copyright infringe-
ment, provided the service provider takes appropriate and prompt remedial action upon
learning of a violation. Id. This approach has not seemed to have found acceptance be-
yond the context of the online service provider, however, and therefore, may not be a
generally accepted limitation on contributory infringement liability. See also MGM Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003).




courts found parties contributorily liable in a variety of circumstances
surrounding the use of taping equipment-the "Make-A-Tape" machines
of the Elektra case, the "Rezound" machines of the RCA case and so on
to the present age of duplication technology. 159 Eventually, honest courts
had to recognize in the evolved case law that providing machinery or
goods that facilitate infringement can establish contributory liability if
they were to enforce honest rules that captured the bad actor within their
scope.
This category of supplying the means or equipment to infringe was
stretched yet further into the Fonovisa standard, so that now, simply pro-
viding the site, facilities or support services to an infringer will do.160
Under the logic of Fonovisa, anyone providing essential support services
with some knowledge that infringement is taking place is liable. 16' The
Fonovisa court justified holding providers of support services liable on
the logic that "it would be difficult for the infringing activity to take place
in the massive quantities alleged without the support services provided by
the swap meet.' 62 Under this logic, if the activity of the direct infringer
were widely known, it would seem that city utilities would be on the hook
for providing a sewage hook up, water and electricity; state and federal
governments could be on the hook for providing roads and other trans-
portation to the site; and, of course, private players like landlords, park-
ing valets, janitorial services, and others would also be presumptively
implicated for providing support services. There are insufficient cases to
see how far the logic of Fonovisa reaches into indirect acts with tenuous
relationships to the infringing activity. At present, however, it seems
clear that once knowledge of infringing activity is known, nobody provid-
ing services of any kind to the direct infringer, from parking to plumbing,
is safe from allegations of copyright infringement.
At least one recent decision demonstrates that there may be some lim-
its to what counts as a material contribution. In Perfect 10, the owner of
copyrights in adult photos pressed claims of contributory infringement
and vicarious liability against Visa, Mastercard and other credit card in-
termediaries for processing transactions from Web sites that were infring-
ing Perfect 10's copyrights. 63 Perfect 10 provides the rare example of the
court concluding that the relationship between defendants conduct and
the infringing activity was too tenuous for contributory infringement 1ia-
159. RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc. 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1984): Elektra
Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
160. Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 264.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Perfect 10, Inc., 2004 WL 1773349, at *1-2. The copyright owner had sent numer-
ous notices to the credit card company defendants asking them to "blacklist" the offending
web sites. Id. The facts of the case, thus, presented an excellent opportunity for examina-
tion of the impact notice has on a defendant's knowledge for purposes of contributory
infringement. Unfortunately, the defendants did not contest the issue of knowledge and
the court did not address it.
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bility to attach. 164 The holding, of course, demonstrates that there are
some limits to the breadth of the material contribution prong. At the
same time, the difficulty the court had in reaching its conclusion in Perfect
10 also demonstrates the absurd breadth of the precedent. 165
The ultimate conclusion may seem plain to the casual observer. Con-
tent neutral financial services, such as credit card companies and banks,
should not be liable for the copyright infringements of their customers. 166
However, Fonovisa and other cases in the field make this a difficult result
to achieve.' 67 The court understood the question to be difficult enough
to merit a published opinion and while one may believe agree with the
Perfect 10 holding, the court was only able to achieve it via a gross mis-
characterization of the precedent and some disregard for logic.
The opinion dutifully recites the Ninth Circuit precedent, including the
rule of Fonovisa, that plumbing, parking and the like constitutes a suffi-
cient contribution to infringement.' 68 Nonetheless, the court concludes
that in the prior cases finding the defendant liable for contributory in-
fringement there were "acts [that] were directly tied to not only the busi-
ness operations of the infringers, but specifically to their infringing
conduct."'1 69 The court stated that, "[ifn each of those cases, the defend-
ants' conduct specifically assisted the infringing activity itself.' 170 It is
difficult to see how parking and plumbing are directly tied to and specifi-
cally assist infringing activity. It is hard to see how such mundane ser-
vices are more deeply connected with infringement than providing what
is, in effect, the financial back end to a piracy operation. The opinion also
attempts to distinguish the broad precedent on the grounds that the ser-
vices provided in the prior cases were "essential," whereas the infringing
web sites at issue in Perfect 10 could continue to operate even without the
services of the defendant credit card companies. 171 The court reasons
that even if the defendants in the case withhold their services, the direct
infringer would still be able to process credit cards through other in-
termediaries not named in the suit. 172 The court also points out that the
infringing sites could continue to operate without accepting credit cards,
by accepting checks or money orders for example. 173 Both assertions are
doubtlessly true, but neither distinguishes the facts of the case from the
''support services" that were held to be contributory acts in prior cases.
In the case of the swap meet, for example, the infringing vendors could
find other locales for hawking their illicit wares even if the defendant in
164. Id. at *4-5.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See generally Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 259.
168. Perfect 10, Inc., 2004 WL 1773349, at *3.
169. Id.






the case at hand were shut down.174 Plumbing, parking and the like seem
less essential to a business than the ability for an online business to accept
credit cards. Plumbing, parking and such support services also seemed
even more fungible and content neutral than providing access to the dom-
inant credit card systems.
The point of the foregoing is not to heap criticism on what is a very
able court when it comes to copyright matters, but to highlight the predic-
ament of a lower court tasked to evaluate a contributory infringement
claim. When examining what constitutes a material contribution, the Per-
fect 10 court had no good options. It could: (1) follow the apparent dic-
tates of the governing precedent to support a holding that most would
find indefensible on its face, i.e., that credit card companies are liable for
the conduct of businesses permitted to process transactions, 175 (2) reach a
more sensible conclusion in open defiance of settled precedent, or (3)
perform whatever rhetorical and logical gymnastics are required to distin-
guish the precedent. Here, the court chose the third option.'7 6
A comparison of this standard to the standard of contributory infringe-
ment in the trademark context illustrates the breadth of the copyright
standard. A person is contributorily liable for trademark infringement if
(1) he intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or (2) he
continues to supply a product knowing that the recipient is using the
product to engage in trademark infringement. 177 Of course, the nature of
the rights protected by trademark and those protected by copyright are
quite different on both conceptual and practical levels. The nature and
circumstances of counterfeiting with respect to each are different as well.
However, a comparison of the two theories of contributory infringement
prior to Fonovisa would be an exercise in hair-splitting. Under both cop-
yright and trademark theories, the defendant intentionally induced, ma-
terially contributed to the infringement of another, or provided some
essential means to infringe with knowledge that the infringement was tak-
ing place. There is no parallel for support services like parking and
plumbing as the basis of contributory infringement in the trademark
context.
As with the knowledge element, there is no apparent, compelling rea-
son driving the expansion of the contributory acts prong. In almost every
traditional media case, including Fonovisa, the defendant directly and
materially participated in the direct infringement. 178 In the typical case,
the defendant participated in the making, distribution, or advertising of
bootleg recordings; designed organizational structures with the conscious
purpose of avoiding license fees; or sold or operated copying equipment
and other necessities of copyright infringement to known infringers. 179
174. See Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 163-64.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
178. Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 261.
179. See, e.g., id.
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Although the Ninth Circuit chose to adopt its expansive standard in Fo-
novisa, it found that the swap meet was liable even under the district
court's more stringent requirement of expressly promoting or encourag-
ing the sale of counterfeit products or in some way protecting the identity
of the infringers. i80
The court chose to base its decision on logic that would find any swap
meet operator liable, but the swap meet at issue in Fonovisa was no run-
of-the-mill swap meet, or at least one would hope not. 181 The swap meet
was widely known for its vendors of bootleg records, was subject to a
sheriff's raid and seizure of 38,000 counterfeit recordings five years
before the appellate case, had received a letter from the sheriff notifying
it of ongoing infringement four years before the case and beginning at
least three years before the case, received regular updates via informal
correspondence or litigation from the plaintiffs that large scale infringe-
ment was taking place. 182 Amid this onslaught of legal and moral pres-
sure, it was uncontroverted that the swap meet failed to take real
remedial action or even cooperate with the police. 183 The bootleggers
were not kicked out and the swap meet operators refused to provide in-
formation regarding the infringing vendors to the authorities.184 The
swap meet operators did, in fact, try to hide the identities of the direct
infringers and in this way intentionally and directly participated in their
scheme. 185 The court had no cause on the facts of the case to hang its
finding on the provision of space, utilities, parking and plumbing. None-
theless, it did, and other circuits have embraced it.186
f. Another Puzzling Expansion
The expansion of the standards for contributory acts is also somewhat
puzzling. The logic and rule of Fonovisa would seem to impose a high
180. Id. at 264.
181. See id. at 261.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 264.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. It is no surprise that the Ninth Circuit and the district courts within its jurisdiction
have embraced Fonovisa, most significantly applying a "site and facilities" analysis to the
Napster system in A&M v. Napster, Inc. 259 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). The fact that Fo-
novisa is law in the Ninth Circuit which embraces Hollywood, Silicon Valley and some of
the world's largest consumer markets is in itself important. Significantly, the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, the hometown court for the publishing and music industries and shared
home of significant segments of the television business, has also embraced the site and
facilities holding of Fonovisa. Arista Records, Inc. v. Mp3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 4660
(SHS), 2002 WL 1997918, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (citing Fonovisa for the proposi-
tion that facilities are enough, in this case, the facilities being the Web site and tools of
Mp3Board.com). In addition, although there have yet to be cases prosecuted against jani-
tors, parking attendants and others who only provide support services, the Fonovisa opin-
ion has been cited approvingly for its statement of secondary copyright liability by the
Sixth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit and a number of district courts. See Gordon v. Nextel
Communications & Mullen Adver., Inc., 345 F.3d 922, 925 (6th Cir. 2003); Procter & Gam-
ble Co. v. Haugen, 317 F.3d 1121, 1128 (10th Cir. 2003); Arista Records, Inc., 2002 WL
1997918, at *6; In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 648 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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standard of vigilance on the part of ordinary service providers not justi-
fied by the policy to encourage self policing. To argue that those provid-
ing plumbing services should police the copyright uses and abuses of
those who benefit from good plumbing seems to be a great stretch.
Moreover, such a stretch, absent an express limiting element such as in-
tent, seems to violate the overriding policy of fairness-getting those cul-
pable on the hook. Although the path is far from clear, the expansion of
what counts as sufficient contributory acts seems to be driven more by
the desire of courts and commentators to generalize and rationalize pre-
cedent than by the facts of the cases.
In trying to make sense of the varied precedent, courts and commenta-
tors have lumped contributory infringement cases into general categories
based upon the acts at issue-cases in which one provides the work to be
copied to an infringer, cases in which one furnishes the work to be copied
and provides copying equipment, cases in which one furnishes copying
facilities, but customers provide the work to be copied and so on.187
While this approach makes the cases more readily digestible, it also tends
to ram complex facts, which usually show a close connection between the
defendant and direct infringement, into overly broad generalizations
which are then carelessly repeated in later opinions, gaining the force of
law.
The prime example of an overly broad generalization morphing into
legal gospel may be found within Fonovisa itself. 188 The only case cited
within Fonovisa for the proposition that provision of site and facilities
constitutes a contributory act is Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v.
Aveco, Inc. 189 In that case, Aveco rented out rooms equipped with
VCR's and televisions to its customers for viewing video tapes.190 When
challenged by a consortium of major film producers, the Third Circuit
held that Aveco, by enabling its customer to watch video cassettes in
viewing rooms, was publicly performing or authorizing the public per-
formance of the plaintiffs' film works.191 The opinion speaks in terms of
a direct violation of plaintiffs' rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106 to publicly
perform its works.192 There is no discussion of contributory infringement
or even a citation to the always-invoked Gershwin opinion. 193 Rather,
the decision flows from a straight analysis of whether the playing of video
cassettes in rooms available for rental to the general public constitutes a
187. David Nimmer, the author of the preeminent copyright treatise, for example, tries
to impose structure on the precedent by breaking the cases down into those in which the
defendant provided the work to be copied and/or made copying equipment or facilities
available. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 12.04[A][2].
188. See generally Fonavisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 259.
189. 800 F.2d 59, 62 n.3 (3rd Cir. 1986).
190. Id.
191. Id. at
192. Id. at 61.
193. See generally Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
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public performance within the meaning of Section 106.194 To the extent
Columbia Pictures may be properly considered a contributory liability
case, it is only in the narrowest, and most traditional sense, that the de-
fendant authorized the direct infringement of another's work. 195
Yet, Columbia Pictures is regularly cited for the broad proposition that
providing the site and facilities for copyright infringement is sufficient to
establish contributory infringement liability.196 Indeed, Columbia Pic-
tures is the sole reed on which the Fonovisa opinion leans. 197 No other
cases are cited for the Ninth Circuit's holding that "support services" will
do. Thus, it appears that the sweeping Fonovisa standard of the Ninth
Circuit reached its conclusion first by reducing the Columbia Pictures
holding into a broad overgeneralization that providing "site and facili-
ties" is enough and then applying the rationale implicit in this generaliza-
tion to substantiate an even broader generalization that "support
services" such as parking, utilities and plumbing will do.
D. THE STANDARD FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY
As discussed above, vicarious liability is the purported child of the
agency principles which holds an employer responsible for the acts of his
employee and a principal responsible for the actions of his agent. 198 Ac-
cordingly, the test is much the same. A party is vicariously liable for the
copyright infringement of another even in the absence of an employer-
employee relationship if "he has the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activi-
ties" 199 Just as knowledge and contributory acts are the touchstones for
contributory infringement, so too are control and financial interest for
vicarious liability.
It is worth stressing that just as an agency relationship requires that the
agent act both on behalf of and for the benefit of the principal, both ele-
ments-control and financial interest-are required for vicarious copy-
right liability to be found.20° Despite this apparent symmetry with basic
agency principles, the scope of vicarious copyright liability extends well
beyond traditional respondeat superior, master/servant liability under the
law of agency. 201 While a master/servant relationship-the prerequisite
194. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 800 F.2d at 62.
195. See supra note 9. This footnote provides a discussion of the debate as to whether
"authorizing" remains an instance of contributory or direct infringement under the 1976
Copyright Act which added the right to authorize exploitation of a protected work as one
of the exclusive rights reserved to copyright owners.
196. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 800 F.2d at 62.
197. Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 264.
198. Id. at 261-62.
199. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) (defining "Agency"); Roy Export
Co. Establishment v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 344 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(noting that vicarious liability will not be found unless both prongs of the test are satisfied).
201. See generally, NIMMER, supra note 9, § 12.04[A][1].
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for respondeat superior tort liability under normal agency principles-
requires that the master (or employer for those inclined to more modern
lingo) have the ability to control the physical movements of the servant in
detail, vicarious copyright liability will be found where the party standing
in the would-be shoes of the agent/servant is an independent contractor
solely responsible for making the decisions relating to his infringing
acts.202 Courts hearing copyright matters have thrown off the constraints
of developed agency principles with the flexible reasoning that "[m]any of
the elements which have given rise to the doctrine of respondeat superior
may also be evident in factual settings other than that of the technical
employer-employee relationship. '2 0 3 Likewise, there are no additional
elements that explore the nature of the relationship between the defen-
dant and the direct infringer, explicit or implicit.
202. The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines agency, principal and agent as
follows:
§ 1. Agency; Principal; Agent
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf
and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.(2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal.
(3) The one who is to act is the agent.
Master, Servant and Independent Contractor are defined:
§ 2. Master; Servant; Independent Contractor
(1) A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his
affairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct
of the other in the performance of the service.(2) A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his
affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is con-
trolled or is subject to the right to control by the master.(3) An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do
something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to
the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the
performance of the undertaking. He may or may not be an agent.
It is plain from the language of the test that vicarious liability includes defendants who
certainly are not the "masters" of direct infringer "servants," those whose physical conduct
is controlled by the defendant. It is also clear from the limited language of the test that a
defendant may be vicariously liable even if he is not an "agent" of the direct infringer.
Although both the copyright test and the definition of agency have an element of "con-
trol," there is no direct requirement that the direct infringer act on behalf of the defendant,
only that the defendant financially benefit from the infringement at issue. Equally impor-
tant, where the Restatement (Second) of Agency makes clear that agency is a fiduciary
relationship that may only arise by the consent of the parties, the copyright analog has no
agreement or consent requirement. The cases are likewise clear in stating that the copy-
right concept of vicarious liability reaches beyond actual agency relationships, that agency
is merely a sort of metaphor that shapes the standard.
In Dreamland Ballroom, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929), the
dance hall found vicariously liable arguably had no voice in the selection of the music, the
performance of which was found to be infringing, no voice in the selection of musicians
furnished by the band leader with whom it contracted, did not select music, did not know
any selection was copyrighted, and did not know that the band leader did not have a li-
cense to perform the music; yet it was found liable for the band leaders infringement
merely by virtue of the contractual relationship of the dancehall to the band leader. This
foundational case makes clear that lack of knowledge and independent contractor status
has nothing to do with vicarious liability.
203. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963)(internal citation omitted).
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Most importantly, unlike contributory infringement, there is no knowl-
edge requirement of any kind in the test for vicarious liability. 2°4 As dis-
cussed above, vicarious liability is a strict liability theory, pinning
damages on the innocent infringer. 20 5 The rationale is that as between
the innocent infringer and the injured copyright owner, it is fair that the
innocent infringer who had the power to prevent the infringement and
who profits from the infringement pay.2°6 Even where a defendant is
wholly unaware of the infringement at issue and even where the defen-
dant has expressly ordered and otherwise made good faith efforts to pre-
vent the infringement at issue from taking place, vicarious liability will be
found if the two essential elements are present.207 This assignment of loss
also serves the twin policy aims of incentivizing policing and spreading
the loss by requiring defendants to internalize copyright infringement as a
cost of doing business.208 Consistent with its strict liability nature, the
burden of vicarious liability may not be easily shifted by contract with the
direct infringer. Although an indemnification provision may give the
dancehall operator or other vicarious infringer a right to recoup the copy-
right damages it must pay from the direct infringer, indemnification pro-
visions and statements that the direct infringer is solely liable for
copyright infringement will not insulate the vicarious infringer from
liability.209
1. Where Vicarious Liability Has Been Found
The instances in which vicarious liability is found are usually distin-
guished from those instances where it is inappropriate through a tidy di-
chotomy between cases involving dancehall owners and independent
contractor orchestras on the one hand and absentee landlords and their
tenants on the other. Vicarious liability for copyright infringement
springs largely from the rich history of cases grappling with the problem
of unlicensed live performances of popular musical compositions in dance
halls and similar establishments.210 Dancehall proprietors accordingly
204. See, e.g., Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1324
(D. Mass. 1994).
205. See id. at 1325.
206. Id.
207. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, Inc.,
554 F.2d 1213, 1214-15 (1st Cir. 1977) (finding horse track liable for playing of infringing
music by independent contractor music provider, despite direct instructions from horse
track management not to play any of plaintiffs compositions).
208. See supra Part VI.
209. Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp at 1322-23 (finding that trade show orga-
nizer's rules, which attempted to shift all responsibility for copyright infringement to indi-
vidual exhibitors, did not shield trade show organizer from vicarious liability).
210. Dreamland Ballroom, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929)
(finding a dance hall proprietor liable for infringing performances of an orchestra even
though the band leader was an independent contractor and the dance hall proprietor had
no voice in the selection of the music or musicians furnished by the bandleader). See gen-
erally Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963) (comparing
the dancehall cases with the landlord/tenant cases and citing a mass of cases spanning forty
years holding dancehall proprietors vicariously liable).
2005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
provide the paradigm of the defendant that should be found vicariously
liable. The factors frequently articulated by courts justifying liability are
the active management and supervision of the dancehall owner and the
fact that the "activities provide the proprietor with a source of customers
and enhanced income" regardless of whether the proprietor has any spe-
cific control over the selections played by the orchestra.211 The case re-
porters are packed with a wall of uniform precedent holding, in effect,
that no matter what the contract says, no matter who hires the musicians,
no matter who picks the tunes, no matter how unsophisticated the defen-
dant is in the ways of copyright royalties, no matter what the defendant
knew or thought-he who hires and profits from the fiddler, must pay for
the tunes, at least in the context of dancehalls, ballrooms and similar busi-
nesses built around the enjoyment of live music performances. 212
In keeping with these common law roots, the inquiry into whether a
party is vicariously liable for the copyright infringements of another is
almost universally framed as an exercise in trying to determine whether
the defendant is more like a dancehall proprietor (and therefore liable)
or an absentee landlord (and therefore not liable as discussed below).
Situations falling on the dancehall (hence vicariously liable) side of the
dichotomy over the years have included a horse racetrack that hired a
third party to install necessary equipment and provide music for its pa-
trons; a trade show organizer that permitted those renting booths in its
space to play music; and a flea market where a vendor renting a space
sold counterfeit records.213
2. Where Vicarious Liability Has Not Been Found
In contrast with the dancehall/orchestra relationship, in the typical
landlord/tenant relationship, the landlord is usually not held responsible
for the infringing acts of his tenant. 214 Where the landlord makes no con-
tribution to the tenant's infringement beyond the obvious provision of
space, only receives a rent check from the tenant and derives no other
financial benefit from the tenant's infringing activities, liability generally
has not been found.2 15 Writing for the Second Circuit (as well as his col-
league on the panel Judge Learned Hand), Judge Augustus Hand set the
baseline: "Something more than the mere relation of landlord and tenant
211. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d at 307.
212. For an extensive list of the "dancehall cases" finding a dancehall operator vicari-
ously liable for the infringements of his orchestra, see H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d at 307-08.
213. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996);
Famous Music Corp., 554 F.2d at 1215; Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1322-23;
214. Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938) (L. Hand, J. & A. Hand, J.)(holding landlord not liable for infringing works sold by tenant on his property); see gener-
ally the discussion in H.L. Green Co.., 316 F.2d at 307-08 (comparing the dancehall cases
with the landlord/tenant cases and citing a mass of cases spanning forty years holding
dancehall proprietors vicariously liable).
215. This is the gloss the H.L. Green Co. court placed on Deutsch v. Arnold and the
other cases finding landlords not vicariously liable for the infringements of their tenants.
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must exist to give rise to a cause of action [of vicarious copyright infringe-
ment]." 2 16 Without more, a landlord should not be held liable for the
copyright infringements of its tenants.
In this thread of precedent, courts have found that the lessor of board-
walk booths is not liable for its tenant selling infringing hand-writing
analysis charts217 and a university is not liable for the exhibition of an
infringing film in its facilities.2 18 Beyond the landlord/tenant relationship,
courts have also found the relationship at issue too remote for vicarious
liability to attach where a real estate broker arranged a sale of land condi-
tioned on the use of infringing building plans;219 where a business spon-
sors a television or radio broadcast in which infringing works are aired;
220
where a publisher passes a work to an independent contractor reader for
comment, who in turn passes it onto another, unrelated party who then
infringes the work. 221 More recently, in the battles over "star pagination"
references to the West Digest case reporters, a court has found that a
publisher of CD-ROM's is not vicariously liable for any infringing use to
which its end users may put its products. 222 Lastly, a district court has
recently concluded that credit card service and processing companies are
not liable for the infringements of the vendors they serve.
223
3. Vicarious Liability-The Right and Ability to Control
In the standard-creating cases, the involvement of the defendant with
the direct infringer was deep and inextricable.2 24 In Gershwin, the defen-
dant talent agency created and managed the neighborhood concert orga-
nizations at issue.225 The court had little trouble basing vicarious liability
on the defendant's "pervasive participation" with the neighborhood orga-
nizations.226 In Shapiro, the direct infringer was a concessionaire within
the defendant's department store, governed by a detailed agreement with
the defendant and subject to the defendant's ongoing oversight and con-
216. Deutsch, 98 F.2d. at 688; See also Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. Hurwitz, 462
F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding that lessor of theater not liable for infringing
performances).
217. Deutsch, 98 F.2d. at 688. As a gloss on Deutsch, the much later H.L. Green Co.
court read Deutsch as standing broadly for the proposition that where the defendant only
receives a rent check and no other benefit from the infringing conduct and does not con-
tribute to the infringement, no liability should attach. See H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d at 307.
218. Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 344 F. Supp. 1350, 1353
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding that university was not vicariously liable for infringing film exhibi-
tion because it had no financial interest in display of films).
219. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
220. Bevan v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
221. Mount v. Book of the Month Club, Inc., 555 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1977).
222. Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding
CD-ROM publisher not liable for infringing use by its end users largely on the ground that
the publisher could not control the behavior of its users).
223. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, No. C 04-0371 JW, 2004 WL 1773349, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2004).
224. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir.
1971).
225. Id. at 1160-61.
226. Id. at 1163.
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trol, including the power to dismiss employees of the concessionaire/di-
rect infringer. 227
Looking to these foundational cases, a later court summarized the con-
trol prong:
[I]t appears that these and other courts implicitly have adopted
terms similar to those described in the legislative record of the
amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976 .... That is, defendants
are found to have "control" over a performance if they "either ac-
tively operate or supervise the operation of the place wherein the
performances occur, or control the content of the infringing
program. "228
Still, the right and ability to control prong of vicarious liability test has
always been a pale shadow of its more robust cousin in the law of agency.
The copyright standard is much broader on its face. Because agency is a
fiduciary relationship with potentially serious consequences, agency re-
quires both parties to consent to control of the would-be agent by the
principal. 229 The relationship need not be consensual for purposes of
copyright.230 Moreover, in the usual course, the analysis becomes even
more refined to determine whether the various indicia of control are
strong enough to conclude that an agent is also a "servant." For tort lia-
bility (a category which is often said to encompass copyright infringe-
ment) to pass, a defendant usually must have the right to control the
physical conduct of the party directly causing the harm.231 No such rela-
tionship or level of physical control is required for purposes of indirect
copyright liability.232 Indeed, the reach of indirect copyright liability is
intended to capture independent contractors, who, by definition, cannot
be servants under general agency law. 233
The way courts approach the problem on a practical level parallels the
differences between the indirect copyright liability and general standards
of agency law. Analyses in agency and corporate contexts tend to focus
227. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d at 306. For an analysis of how tenuous control within an
organization may generally be to avoid vicarious liability outside the copyright context, see
generally Davis v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
228. Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1328 (internal citation to the House
Report omitted).
229. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) AGENCY § 1 (1958).
230. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162.
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 2 & 220 (1958). The Restatement pro-
vides a detailed list of ten factors to consider when determining whether a master/servant
relationship exists. The factors include the following: the extent of control granted under
any agreement, the skill required, who supplies the tools, the length of service and the
understanding of the parties, among others. This inquiry is altogether lacking in the copy-
right analysis.
232. See, e.g., Dreamland Ballroom, Inc. v. Shapiro Bernstein Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th
Cir. 1929).
233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 2, cmt. B (1958). "The word 'servant' is usedin contrast with 'independent contractor.' The latter term includes all persons who con-
tract to do something for another but who are not servants in doing the work undertaken.
An agent who is not a servant is, therefore, an independent contractor when he contracts
to act on account of the principal." Id.
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extensively on exactly who held what authority, who was answerable to
whom on what matters, and who was subject to what internal procedures
to determine whether one is an agent.234 By comparison, the copyright
cases are glib on this point. Because the copyright doctrine grew out of
the dancehall/orchestra problem and courts were determined that
whatever the logic, the dancehall operator is liable in copyright, the
courts fashioning the copyright doctrine could not be so sharp with regard
to the power of the defendant over the direct infringer.235 If they were, a
dance-hall owner could easily dodge liability by placing all authority in
the hands of the band leader. No control, no liability. Thus, the control
required has always been somewhat theoretical, to the critic of the doc-
trine, perhaps even imaginary. The focus is on the defendant's potential
or as the standard puts it, "the right and ability to control," regardless of
what the contract says and how the relationship actually works in
practice.236
Because the question is one as to ultimate, rather than practical, opera-
tional control, the power to exclude suffices to establish the right and
ability to control. In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a swap
meet operator "had the right to terminate vendors for any reason whatso-
ever and through that right had the ability to control the activities of ven-
dors on the premises. '237 The ultimate right to preclude the infringing
activity from taking place by simply precluding all activity of the sort at
issue will also suffice. 238 So, in Polygram, the trade show organizer's
power to preclude all vendors at the show from playing any music what-
soever satisfied the right and ability to control prong with respect to in-
fringing music played by a specific vendor in a rented booth.239 The
defendant's ultimate power to exclude or choose not to draw end custom-
ers also satisfies the right and ability to control prong.240 The court in
Fonovisa cited the swap meet promoter's control over the access of cus-
tomers to the swap meet and its promotion of the swap meet to support
its conclusion that the swap meet operator had the right and ability to
234. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 2 & 220, case summaries
& citations (1958).
235. See, e.g., Dreamland Ballroom, Inc., 36 F.2d at 355.
236. The Restatement (Second) of Agency speaks in terms of the "right to control" as
well, but for tort liability to pass not only must the control be much deeper (the physical
conduct of the agent for it to be deemed a servant), but the inquiry is much more exacting,
taking into account all the factors of section 220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220 (1958).
237. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1996).
238. See Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1328-29.
239. Id. at 1328 (emphasizing that the trade show organizor's "Rules and Regulations"
permitted it to "restrict exhibits that 'because of noise, method of operation, materials or
any other reason become objectionable"' and to police exhibitors during the show). See
also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The ability
to block infringers' access to a particular environment for any reason whatsoever is evi-
dence of the right and ability to supervise.").
240. Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 263-64.
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control the vendor of counterfeit records. 241
Under this logic, rules governing the relationship between the defen-
dant and the direct infringer can never serve to show that the defendant
did not have the ight and ability to control. Indeed, the very existence of
rules shows that the defendant did have such power and simply opted not
to impose a rule that would have prevented the infringement from taking
place. 242
The cases finding sufficient control lacking are few, serving to highlight
how tenuous a relationship must be to avoid vicarious liability. A real
estate broker does not have sufficient control over what plans the sellers
foist upon the buyers;243 an uninvolved, third-party advertiser lacks suffi-
cient control over television broadcasting decisions; 244 a vendor cannot
control what its customers do with its products;245 and, while it is settled
that one may be vicariously liable for the infringement of an independent
contractor, the buck may stop there. At least one case indicates that lia-
bility cannot be passed all the way back if the defendant gives a copy-
righted work to an independent contractor, who, in turn, gives the work
to someone else without authorization, who then infringes the copyright
in the work.246
Another recent case suggests a limit on the right and ability to control
prong.247 In finding that credit card servicing companies lacked sufficient
control over the vendors they serve for vicarious liability purposes, the
court noted that the defendants had no contractual right to dictate what
vendors may do in their business and thus had no direct control over the
infringing activity at issue.248 This court did not, however, reject the logic
that the power to exclude evidences sufficient control in the usual case.2 49
Instead, it concluded in a strange twist of logic that even if defendants did
prevent the direct infringer from using the services of the defendant
credit card companies, the direct infringer could continue its infringing
activity by using other credit card companies and/or accepting payment
by other means.250 It is unclear if any other courts will adopt this appar-
ent rule that the power to exclude only establishes the right and ability to
control if the services withheld are truly "essential" to the infringing ac-
241. Id.; see also Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1329 (noting the trade show
organizers' promotion of the trade show as a factor supporting a finding of a right and
ability to control).
242. See e.g., Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1329 ("[T]he fact that Interface
instructed exhibitors to comply with the copyright laws does not demonstrate a lack of
control. Rather, it is compatible with an inference that Interface, though retaining and
exercising control in fact, attempted to shift legal responsibility from itself to others."). See
also Famous Music Corp., 422 F. Supp. at 342-43.
243. Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 292-93.
244. Bevan, 329 F. Supp. at 610-11.
245. Matthew Bender & Co., 158 F.3d at 689-90.
246. Bevan, 329 F. Supp. at 610.





Evolutionary Drift of Vicarious Liability
tivity such that it could not continue once the defendant kicked out the
direct infringer. 251
It may not overstate the breadth of the right and ability to control ele-
ment to say that any ongoing commercial relationship may suffice for vi-
carious copyright liability purposes, unless the infringement is wholly
unrelated to defendant's business. If the relationship can be terminated
or is otherwise subject to binding rules imposed in part by the defendant,
the right and ability to control will likely be found.
4. Vicarious Liability-Direct Financial Interest
The H.L. Green Co. standard also requires "an obvious and direct fi-
nancial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials .... "252 The
requirement of a financial benefit is presumably a stand-in for the re-
quirement in agency that an agent act for the benefit of the principal. 253
As with the control element, the copyright adaptation of agency princi-
ples is far more lax on its face. Here, too, there is no requirement that
the relationship be mutually consensual as in a true principal-agent rela-
tionship. 254 Also, the direct infringer need not act on behalf of the defen-
dant. It is enough that the defendant receive a financial benefit from the
conduct. 255
Two interpretive strains in the caselaw emerge, one that actually re-
quires that the link between the infringement and the financial benefit be
"obvious and direct" and one that effectively reads these limiting terms
out of the standard, permitting almost any hypothetical financial benefit,
however amorphous, unquantifiable, and tenuously linked to the in-
fringement, to suffice.256 The actual text of the standard aside, either rule
arguably fits the dancehall paradigm.257
251. Id. The reasoning of the court is difficult to defend, though its impetus to narrow
the right and ability to control element is understandable. Under the limitation crafted by
the court, the right to exclude establishes the right and ability to control only where the
defendant's services are truly essential to the infringing activity. As the opinion explains:
"[T]he allegedly infringing websites will be able to continue their alleged infringing con-
duct regardless of whether Defendants blacklist them. Therefore, Defendants' ability to
rescind their services does not indicate control over the websites' alleged infringing ac-
tions." Id. This rule seems to make a finding of vicarious liability contingent on what the
market could supply the direct infringer in the absence of the defendant's services.
Unfortunately, the Perfect 10 court did not reach the question of financial interest, hav-
ing already dispatched the matter with its finding of alignment with the right and ability to
control. A determination of whether a credit card company's percentage rate on the
purchase of infringing materials counts as a direct financial interest would, however, have
been a useful contribution to the law.
252. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co, 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
254. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
255. See, e.g., Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1330
(D. Mass 1974).
256. Compare H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d at 308, with Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F.
Supp. at 1331.
257. See generally Dreamland Ball Room, Inc., 36 F.2d at 354.
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The requirement that the financial benefit be "direct" would seem to
require a close relationship between the value derived from the infringe-
ment and the defendant's business, ruling out the lengthy chains of causal
logic on which many cases rest.2 58 If the copyright owner's theory is that
the infringement provides a draw for customers, which in turn makes the
venue more desirable, which in turn permits the defendant to raise its
rent demands or drink prices, perhaps there are too many steps from the
infringement to the defendant's wallet to say that the financial benefit is
direct. For a financial benefit to be "obvious," it would seem that no
indirect, amorphous, impossible-to-measure benefits will suffice, that a
real flow of dollars from the infringing activity to the defendant must be
plain. This is arguably the case in the classic dancehall situation.259
People go to dancehalls and pay all the associated expenses to the
dancehall owners-gate fees, food, and drink prices-to dance to the mu-
sic performed inside. The orchestra and the music it plays are the heart
of the business, making the link between the financial success of the
dance hall and the tunes it plays direct and obvious, even if the proprietor
chooses to cash in on drinks and concessions rather than the right to
dance itself.
In several key cases the linkage is even more direct and obvious. In
H.L. Green, for example, the defendant actually received a percentage of
every sale of a bootleg record, profiting directly from the infringing activ-
ity.2 60 Recent courts have followed this reasoning, concluding that
"where a defendant rents space or services on a fixed rental fee that does
not depend on the nature of the activity of the lessee, courts usually find
no vicarious liability because there is no direct financial benefit. 2 61 In
fact, these cases include the district court opinion in Fonovisa (squarely
overturned by the Ninth Circuit), which found the financial link between
vendors selling counterfeit records at a swap meet and the swap meet
operator too tenuous to support vicarious infringement. 262
From an accounting point of view, however, it may appear that
dancehall revenues have nothing to do with music, as the customers pay
for entry, drinks, and the like. Music is a straight expense for the
dancehall operator, incurred presumably in the belief that the live music
enhances the experience for its customers, which in turn, raises the num-
258. Id. at 355.
259. Id.
260. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d at 306.
261. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1376 (N.D. Cal. 1995). See also cases cited by Netcom in support.
262. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1497 (E.D. Cal. 1994),
rev'd 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). In Fonovisa, the defendant contended that "a commis-
sion, directly tied to the sale of particular infringing items, is required." Fonovisa, Inc., 76
F.3d at 263. The Ninth Circuit held in the alternative that "admission fees, concession
stand sales and parking fees, all of which flow directly from customers who want to buy the
counterfeit recordings" is enough. Id.
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bers on the bottom line.263 Apparently viewing things in this way, a num-
ber of courts have overlooked the "direct and obvious" limitations,
plausibly inserting an implicit "however indirect and amorphous" to
broaden the reach of liability.264 Indeed, the District Court of Massachu-
setts in an uncommon act of intellectual honesty in its Polygram decision
expressly rejected the H.L. Green standard requiring a "direct and obvi-
ous" financial benefit, adopting instead language from a Judiciary Com-
mittee report on the 1976 Copyright Act which requires only that the
defendant "expect commercial gain from the operation and either direct
or indirect benefit for the infringing performance. '265 Under this ap-
proach, which the District of Massachusetts states "more nearly captures
the standard that is currently applied by courts in copyright cases," the
financial benefit requirement does not significantly limit vicarious copy-
right liability.2 6 6 If the defendant is a for-profit venture and chooses to
permit others to provide music or other copyrighted material to its pa-
trons or customers, one can safely presume that there is a sufficient finan-
cial benefit. 267 Indeed, one must strain to identify any commercial
situations involving the performance or distribution of copyrighted works
that would not meet this lax standard.
Under this dominant view of the financial benefit required, not only is
a financial benefit all but presumed in the context of a commercial enter-
prise, but it seems that almost any quanta of benefit, however minute, is
sufficient. 268 In Polygram, the defendant trade show operator argued un-
successfully that no liability should attach to it because only four out of
the 2,000 exhibitors, occupying a mere 0.002% of the total exhibition
space played copyrighted music. 269 The court concluded that "full assess-
ment of the amount of benefit is not required to determine liability
... only whether the defendant derived a benefit from the infringement
that was substantial enough to be considered significant. '270 In a neat
causal chain, the court concluded that despite the apparently de minimus
role of music in the trade show (if the defendant's declaration is to be
believed), some exhibitors performed music, some of it copyrighted, to
attract customers to their booths and that these performances provided a
significant benefit not only to the individual exhibitors seeking to attract
attention to their booths, but to the trade show operators as well.
271
263. This is arguably true only in the same way movies have nothing to do with the
movie theatre business which, looking at things with a profit orientation, really is in the
business of selling overpriced sodas and popcorn.
264. See H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d at 307.
265. Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1326 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,
at 159-60 (1976)) (emphasis added).
266. Id.
267. See, e.g., id. at 1330-31.
268. See, e.g., id. at 1333.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1331-32.
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Sadly, the court does not bridge the chasm between the defendant's
data regarding the small role of music performed by third parties in its
own enterprise and the court's conclusion that it provides a "significant"
financial benefit nonetheless.2 72 It is hard to identify what exactly is the
financial benefit to the trade show organizers that is "significant." Is the
court concluding that the bottom line to the trade show business would
be significantly different if they had precluded the playing of music by the
four out of 2,000 vendors who wished to play music? Or, is the court
taking the position that any performance that may increase the attractive-
ness of the venue to customers necessarily results in financial benefit to
the business? There is no clear answer in the opinion.
This analysis may appear to give undue weight to a district court opin-
ion from a district not known as a hotbed of copyright jurisprudence. It
is, however, an extraordinarily thorough opinion and, for the most part,
candidly expresses the standards implicit in other opinions, including Fo-
novisa, which pay undue homage to the H.L. Green standard given their
extremely broad view of the financial interest prong.273
5. The Evolution of the Vicarious Liability Standard
The caselaw does not show a clear progression from a limited doctrine
of vicarious liability to a more expansive one as in the case of contribu-
tory infringement. The doctrine has been rootless and hence somewhat
wild, from the outset. By cutting the doctrine free of the strictures of
agency law and respondeat superior liability, and by insisting that vicari-
ous liability may be found where no master/servant relationship exists,
the courts have made the situations in which vicarious liability will apply
hazy at best. It appears that the doctrine, such as it is, has always been
driven by ultimate policy concerns of the justice of apportioning loss be-
tween a business, which may benefit in some way from infringement even
if remotely, minutely, immeasurably and innocently, and the injured cop-
yright owner.
As such, differing views of the scope of the doctrine have manifested
themselves largely in differing approaches to the financial benefit re-
272. Id. at 1332.
273. The holding in Fonovisa could be justified under the H.L. Green Co. "direct and
obvious" requirement, if the court had made findings (at which the scanty facts recited
indicate may have been supportable) that the counterfeit record vendors were not a small
draw amidst an array of other vendors of every kind, but for this swap meet were the draw,
the lifeblood of the swap meet, its raison d'etre. Unfortunately, the Fonovisa court be-
lieved it had finished the analysis when it concluded that "admission fees, concession stand
sales and parking fees, all of which flow directly from customers who want to buy the
counterfeit recordings" is enough. Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 263. The opinion does not
address the quanta, or as the Polygram court puts it, the significance of those revenues to
the swap meet enterprise. See generally id.; Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at
1331-32.
The standard articulated in Polygram more easily explains the holding in Famous Music
Corp., 554 F.2d at 1214-15 than does the H.L. Green standard recited by the court in Fa-
mous Music. See Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1333 (holding a racetrack
liable).
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quirement, with some courts imposing the "direct and obvious" limita-
tions of the H.L. Green standard, and many others reciting the H.L.
Green standard, but actually applying something far more akin to the
Polygram, House Report standard which supports liability no matter how
indirect the financial benefit may be.274
The oft-repeated dichotomy between dancehalls which are liable and
landlords which are not fails to offer any real guidance or distinction in
the end.275 In the bedrock case for the proposition that landlords are not
liable, Deutsch v. Arnold, the defendant leased booths on a boardwalk,
presumably to various vendors of novelties and amusements, including
the infringing seller of the hand-writing analysis chart.276 Is this really
different in kind from the swap meet operator in Fonovisa renting booths
to vendors, including the one selling bootleg records? 277 Whatever differ-
ences in gestalt one may sense, the legal conclusion for both dancehall
operators and landlords is the same under an honest analysis employing
the broad, predominant view of financial benefit.278 In both cases, the
right of control is clear.279 Because most landlords impose rules of con-
duct via the lease and retain termination rights if those rules are violated,
it is hard to see how even the most absentee of landlords could fail to
exercise sufficient actual or potential control. The dancehall and the
landlord could be distinguished by the requirement that the financial ben-
efit from the infringement be direct and obvious. In the dancehall, where
music performance is the engine of the whole enterprise, the benefit to
the business is plain, or direct and obvious. In the case of the typical
landlord leasing a property to anyone able to pay the rent, it usually
would not be, assuming the core business of the landlord to be buying,
leasing and managing properties. However, applying the predominant,
Polygram view which tolerates indirect benefits apparently no matter
how slight, anything that is good for the tenants probably provides a sig-
nificant enough benefit to the landlord to pass muster.280 Like the trade
show operator in Polygram, any landlord who "permits" her tenants to
perform unlicensed music, makes the rented space more attractive to
both the tenants, and the tenant's customers and therefore benefits suffi-
ciently.281 As taught in Polygram, the quanta of benefit is irrelevant to a
finding of liability, as is the unquantifiable nature of the benefit. 282 Only
a hypothetical or presumptive benefit of some kind is required.283 Courts
274. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 159-60 (1976).
275. Compare Dreamland Ballroom, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355,
with Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938).
276. Deutsch, 98 F.2d at 687.
277. See Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 261.
278. See Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1331.
279. See, e.g. Deutsch, 98 F.2d at 688; Dreamland Ballroom, Inc., 36 F.2d at 355.






do not get caught up in dollars and cents made in the normal case.284
One can come up with a number of more definite ways of drawing the
line. One could return to the basic rules of agency that have served all
other aspects of the business arena so well to hold that a defendant is
potentially liable only if the infringing performance was made on its be-
half and for its benefit per the Restatement definition of agency.2 85 One
could take a harder look at the control prong to find liability only if the
defendant had the contractual right to police the performances. Many
other rules are defensible, but none seems to capture all the precedent.
In the end, the doctrine of vicarious copyright liability seems to be less
a doctrine of rules that provides foreseeable results and more a vehicle
for courts to make ultimate policy judgments as to what type of enter-
prises should internalize the costs of copyright injuries occurring within
its sphere of operations. If, as a policy matter, courts insist on holding
businesses liable where the infringement is at the core of the business
(dancehalls), businesses that benefit in small ways that may be hard to
quantify (background music at racetracks and the like) and businesses
engaged in leasing certain types of retail space (departments within
stores, trade show booths and swap meet stalls), while providing amnesty
for other landlords, then real, explanatory standards will be tough to
find.2
8 6
The case law provides some predictability by allowing one to reason by
analogy to business contexts already adjudicated-dancehalls, trade
shows, real estate brokers, racetracks-but the search for an explanatory
test remains elusive.287 Under the dominant, broad view as expressed in
Fonovisa, any business anywhere near an infringement, whether or not
the infringing activity is part of its own business, faces a real threat of
liability.2 88
X. CONCLUSION: THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EVOLVED
DOCTRINES IN THE TANGIBLE WORLD DOES NOT MATCH
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE DOCTRINES
The doctrines described above are employed to evaluate the ultimate
merits of: a centralized peer-to-peer system (Napster) versus a fully-dis-
tributed network (Grokster); instant messaging programs (such as AOL
instant messenger) versus software clients which optimize an instant mes-
senger for the broad sharing of files (Aimster); and internet service prov-
iders versus BBS operators (Netcom)-all of which involve technical
284. See, e.g., id.
285. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
286. See generally Dreamland Ball Room, Inc., 36 F.2d at 354; Famous Music Corp., 423
F. Supp. at 341; Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1314; Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at
259.
287. See generally Dreamland Ball Room, Inc., 36 F.2d at 354; Famous Music Corp., 423
F. Supp. at 341; Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1314; Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at
259.
288. Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 264.
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capabilities and relationships among individuals, machines and content
without close prior analogy. The companion piece to this article exam-
ines the application of the doctrines to such novel technologies-first ex-
ploring the law developed with respect to analog recording devices and
then moving on to see how the law as modified fares with respect to the
challenges of the Internet, distributed file sharing and other modem com-
puter networks.
The law as it evolved up to the precipice of the technology/content
wars seems greatly overtasked. Even taken on its own terms, in the con-
text of its own tangible media problems, the rules appear to be little more
than loose guidelines that offer few interpretive constraints to courts. If
any form of support services can constitute a material contribution to
copyright infringement and the knowledge required is generalized knowl-
edge that infringement of the sort alleged is taking place, how distant
must a relationship be to avoid copyright liability? The same question
may be posed with respect to vicarious liability. If the right to control
may be established by the power to exclude or refuse to transact business
with the infringer and the financial benefit required is satisfied by the
syllogistic logic that businesses do what is good for them, so if they do it,
they must benefit financially, what commercial relationships are too loose
to avoid the translation of copyright liability? The policy aim of fairness
appears to be at the whim of the strict liability policy rationales of loss
spreading and incentivizing policing. 289
The doctrines of secondary copyright liability fail to a large extent by
their own terms. They purport to bring accepted agency principles of re-
spondeat superior and tort principles of joint liability for joint tortfeasors
to copyright infringement, but they translate these broad concepts with-
out some of the key limiting factors present in tort and agency law. The
rationales and language of the rules spread to encompass a long history of
ad hoc rulings, resulting in a breadth that is hard to justify, even by the
policy objectives the doctrines are intended to serve. Without a precise
analog in the precedent, the rules have little predictive force with respect
to new situations. We know, for example, that leasing booths at a trade
show or swap meet has implications for copyright liability, while leasing
kiosks on a boardwalk does not, but we cannot say much about other
lessor/lessee relationships absent a prior opinion on the topic. 290 This
breadth, of course, makes the challenge of handling novel technologies
without close precedent in the litigated past, such as distributed computer
networks, all the more difficult to parse.
The evolution of the doctrines in the tangible past cut a silhouette of
very general principles intended to capture a significant body of disparate
results. They do not inspire confidence as an appropriate arbiter between
289. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-50
(1984).
290. See Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1333; Deutsch, 98 F.2d at 288.
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the interests of content and technology across all platforms and business
organizations. That, however, is precisely the mission which has fallen to
these doctrines and that will be the subject of the companion piece to this
article.291
291. Craig A. Grossman, From Sony to Grokster, The Failure of the Copyright Doc-
trines of Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Liability to Resolve the War Between
Content and Destructive Technologies, 53 BuFF. L. REV. 141 (on file with author).
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